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Major Professor: Barton Lipman, Professor, Department of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters devoted to the study of communication games and
behavioral economics.
The rst chapter extends the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS). In CS, a
speaker (S) uses cheap talk to persuade a decision maker (DM) to select an action as protable
to S as possible. This paper shows that the presence of an outside option  that is, allowing
DM to avoid taking any action, yielding state-independent reservation utilities to DM and S 
has an important qualitative impact on the results. Contrary to CS, in this model, the informa-
tiveness of communication is not always decreasing in the level of conict of interest. Relatedly,
communication can be more informative than in CS.
The second chapter uses a di¤erent version of my cheap talk model with an outside option to
explore managerial issues such as delegation and interpersonal authority. In this chapter, actions
are costly for DM, and Ss information is noisy. Hence, the agents may agree or disagree on the
ex-ante ranking over projects, and DM may choose not to carry out any project. Unlike in the
standard cheap talk model (without an outside option), when their ex-ante rankings coincide, S is
more tempted to lie and hide bad news about both agentsex-ante most preferred project because
DM is highly likely to carry it out. Consequently, when their ex-ante rankings coincide, DM can
have less incentives to delegate the choice of project to S and more incentives to use interpersonal
authority than when their ex-ante rankings di¤er.
The third chapter develops a theory of "personal rules" to explain a paradoxical stylized fact
v
that increasing punishment rates can increase crime. This theory, based on the tradeo¤ between
ones self-image of criminal productivity and the temptation of committing a crime, analyzes the
way the agent may transform lapses into precedents. The foundation for this transformation
is imperfect recall of ones own criminal productivity, which leads people to draw inaccurate
inferences from their past actions. Rationalization may lead them to overestimate the utility of
committing a crime when the opportunity presents itself.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Cheap Talk with Outside Options1
1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we add an element to the celebrated Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of cheap
talk, hereafter CS. We assume that the receiver (R) may respond to the message of the sender
(S) by taking no action. This "inaction," interpreted as an outside option, yields each player a
state-independent reservation utility. Surprisingly, we nd that the results of this model are quite
di¤erent from those of CS. An important insight of CS is that as the level of conict of interest
between R and S increases, the informativeness of communication decreases; this is not true in
our model. In this model, communication may become more informative as the conict of interest
between R and S increases.
It is not di¢ cult to imagine scenarios where R may opt out from the relationship with S and
avoid taking any action. Consider, for instance, the case of an expert in an organization who
makes a proposal to senior management on an important issue of business strategy. Clearly, the
senior management can implement a modied version of the proposal, accept the proposal, or
ignore the proposal and continue with business as usual. Consumers investment decisions also
apply. For example, consider a bank and its private customer. The customer has some amount of
money in his checking account. The bank recommends its investment product to the customer.
The customer may be persuaded and decide how much he will invest in it. Alternatively, the
customer may decide to not invest in it at all and leave his money in his checking account because
he thinks he does not have su¢ cient information to take the risk. Returns from "action" of
investments are uncertain and dependent on the state of the nancial market while returns from
the "inaction" of not investing are predetermined and independent of the state.2
1This chapter is joint work with Kaiwen Leong.
2As a practical matter, the "inaction" of not investing is di¤erent from the "action" of investing zero if, for
example, there are transactions costs associated with having an investment account.
2Thus, the assumption in CS that R must take an action is not always realistic. Of course,
if the assumption does not have a signicant impact on the results, the simplication poses no
problems. But this paper shows otherwise. CS predicts that, when conicts of interest are large,
little information is transmitted. Thus, in organizations, management should always employ
people whose biases are as low as possible.3 However, this conclusion is not valid in this model.
To see the intuition for the result that conict of interest can facilitate communication, consider
the problem of a project manager in a rm.4 The rm is considering starting a new product
line. The manager will decide the scale of a new investment as in CS. But in this model the
manager has an additional option: he can choose to continue with business as usual and make
no investment. The consequences of business as usual are predictable to everyone in the rm.
But the consequences of new investments depend on technical issues which are only known to an
expert in the rm. The rms prot is maximized if the manager fully internalizes the experts
information and selects the optimal investment. Hence, the manager asks the expert for advice
about the new investment before making a decision. Increasing the rms prot is benecial for
both agents, but the expert is biased toward a larger investment than the manager by some xed
amount b in order to benet his future career. Hence, in this example, the manager is R, the
expert is S, the scale of the new investment represents an action, business as usual represents
inaction, and b represents conict of interest.
The biased expert does not report the rms optimal investment to the manager exactly; he
partitions his information into nitely many categories. In addition, as in CS, his advice gets
noisier as the rms optimal investment gets larger. For example, the expert may use one of three
categories, small,mediumand large,where largeis the coarsest category. On the other
hand, the manager has single peaked preferences conditional on the truth and hence selects an
investment only if he has a lot of information about a new investment. Hence, the manager selects
business as usual when the expert reports "large" because the information is too noisy, that is,
lacking details of information that the manager needs to condently make an investment. He
selects a new investment when the expert reports smallor medium.
In this case, when the expert nds the rms optimal investment is large, he may have an
3See Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Dessein (2002).
4We thank Andrew Newman for suggesting this example.
3incentive to lie and report medium.Let us compare a more biased expert (i.e., b is large) and a
less biased expert (i.e., b is small). First, suppose the more biased expert nds the rms optimal
investment is large. He honestly reports large so that the manager selects business as usual
because an investment which he can induce by reporting "medium" is far from what the expert
prefers because the conict of interest is large. Next, suppose the less biased expert nds the rms
optimal investment is large. He now has a great incentive to lie and report mediumbecause
an investment he can induce by reporting "medium" is close to what he prefers. The less biased
expert can not use three categories honestly and hence conveys less information. In other words,
the more biased expert can use a larger number of categories in his report because he has a smaller
incentive for reporting "medium." Hence, conict of interest can facilitate communication.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature. Section
3 describes the basic model. Section 4 provides a characterization of equilibria. Section 5 deals
with a welfare analysis. Section 6 explains comparative statics. Section 7 compares outcomes in
this model and CS. Section 8 concludes the paper. Proofs are in the appendix.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is most closely related to CSs analysis of information transmission as mentioned in
Section 1. Our study is also related to the economics of pandering: S biases his advice toward
actions that look better for R given Rs prior belief. Che, Dessein and Kartik (2013) study the
economics of pandering using a cheap talk model with an outside option but with a di¤erent
focus from this paper. Che, Dessein and Kartik mainly consider the case where R and S have
identical preferences over actions and so x the level of conict of interest.5 They assume that
the payo¤s from the outside option can be di¤erent between R and S. Thus, if the outside option
is relatively protable for R but not for S, S biases his recommendation toward an action that
ex-ante looks better for R in order to prevent R from selecting the outside option, even when S
knows some other action makes both agents better o¤. The presence of the outside option can
worsen information transmission.6 On the other hand, this paper compares di¤erent levels of
5They also consider an extension where R and S have di¤erent preferences over actions in their supplementary
appendix.
6Brandenburger and Polak (1996) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) also show that Ss incentive for pandering can
worsen information being transmitted to R. Brandenburger and Polak show that when a corporate manager cares
about his rms short-run stock price, he will distort his investment decision toward what, the market believes, is the
4conict of interest and shows that information transmission can be non-monotonic in the conict
of interest in the presence of the outside option.
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) study economics of pandering by comparing di¤erent levels of
conict of interest but consider a di¤erent situation from this paper. In Caillaud and Tirole, S
persuades R to accept his proposal by sending a report. S does not have any information relevant
to R and hence there is no information transmission per se. R can verify the report at his cost
before making a decision or ignore the report. On the other hand, in this paper S sends a cheap
talk message to R and persuades R to select a project as protable to S as possible. Nevertheless,
Caillaud and Tirole come to a similar conclusion to this paper that Rs information acquisition
decision can be non-monotonic in the conict of interest.7
Many studies have used games of communication to understand issues in organizational eco-
nomics. Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2009) and this paper show that larger conicts of interest
can allow the organization to utilize local information more e¤ectively. However, the approaches
are di¤erent between the two papers. Landier, Sraer and Thesmar study a costly signaling model
where there is an informed manager (S) and an uninformed worker (R) in the rm. The manager
selects a project. But for the project to succeed, the worker should implement it by putting in
his best e¤orts. Thus, the manager may intentionally select the suboptimal project for the rm
in order to motivate the worker. On the other hand, this paper studies a costless signaling model
a cheap talk model where there is an uninformed manager (R) and an informed expert (S).
The manager selects and implements a project. The expert does not fully reveal his information
to the manager in order to persuade the manager to select and start a project as protable to the
expert as possible.
Chiba and Leong (2013) study managerial issues by using a cheap talk model with an outside
option, but have a di¤erent focus from this paper. Chiba and Leong use a simple model where
best even if he knows it is not the best for the rms long-run prot. Maskin and Tirole show that in representative
democracy, politicians may pander to public opinion and select a suboptimal popular policy rather than the right
policy for society so that they will get reelected. In these models, it is actions that are distorted by an informed
agent, not communication directly.
7 In Caillaud and Tirole, Ss benet from the proposed project is positive, which is common knowledge. But
Rs benet can be positive or negative, which is apriori unknown to anyone. R can know her benet from the
project only by verifying a report given by S. The conict of interest is measured by Rs prior that the project is
unsuccessful for R. Caillaud and Tirole show that R veries the report sent by S only when the conict of interest is
medium. R ignores the report and denies the proposal when the conict of interest is large. R accepts the proposal
without verifying the report when the conict of interest is small.
5there are two states and two actions and study practical managerial issues such as interpersonal
authority and transparency about Ss bias.8 In contrast to Chiba and Leong, this paper directly
extends CS where there are continuum states and continuum actions and focuses on fundamental
issues such as the relationship between conicts of interest and information transmission.
Matthews (1989) studied a bargaining game including a veto stage and introduced outside
options in alternative ways in cheap talk models. In his game, S instead of R has an option
to selection inaction. More specically, S can either accept Rs proposal of an action or veto
the proposal and select inaction. In Matthews, unlike in our model and CS, Rs ideal action is
independent of Ss information, xed and commonly known, while Ss ideal action depends on
his private information. To prevent S from vetoing a proposal, R has an incentive to pander and
propose an action which seems to R closer to Ss favorite outcome.9
1.3 Model
There are two players, the receiver (R) and the sender (S). R chooses either some action a 2 R
or the outside option of inaction a = ?. There is a state of the world, denoted . Nature chooses
 according to a uniform distribution with support [0,1]. If R selects an action, its consequences
depend on the state. On the other hand, if R selects the outside option of inaction, its consequences
are already known to everyone. Only S observes the true realization of . S reports the state of
the world using a cheap talk message m 2 [0; 1] to R, after which R chooses a.
Let U j denote the payo¤ function of player j=R, S. When some action a 2 R is selected, each
players payo¤ is given by a standard quadratic loss function:
UR =   (a  )2 ; (1)
US =   (a     b)2 ;
8 In Chiba and Leong (2013), there are only two states and two actions. Again, R has an outside option to
take inaction. Also, an action is costly for R and inaction is costless for both players. Hence, S may recommend
a suboptimal action which is ex-ante preferred by R in order to convince R to take an action. If S has more
similar preferences to R, he may have a larger incentive to distort his message. Chiba and Leong explore interesting
managerial issues. The rst issue is related to the manager (S)s choice between interpersonal authority and
communication to make the worker (R) obey. The second is related to how transparency about the bias of a
nancial adviser (S) a¤ects the quality of his advice toward his client (R). The third is related to the expert (S)s
costly e¤ort to acquire information before he gives advice to the manager (R).
9Shimizu (2012) also considers a model including an exit stage where S has an outside option to exit. In Shimizu,
like in our model and CS, both playersideal actions depend on Ss information. Conict of interest over ideal actions
can facilitate information transmission because R may have an incentive to select an action which seems to R closer
to Ss favorite action, which may encourage S to reveal his information.
6where b > 0. When the outside option of inaction a = ? is selected, each players payo¤ is given
by a state independent reservation utility:
UR =  uR; (2)
US =  uS ;
where uR > 0 and uS > 0. All aspects of the game except  are common knowledge.
The timeline is as follows. First, nature chooses the state  according to a uniform distribution
with support [0,1], which is observed by S. Second, S reports the state using a cheap talk message
m 2 [0; 1] to R. Third, R decides whether to take some action, denoted a 2 R, or inaction, denoted
a = ?. Finally, the outcome is realized for every player.
Given any , Rs ideal decision is a = , and Ss ideal decision is a =  + b. Thus, b measures
the level of conict of interest as in CS.
This model is almost equivalent to CS. The presence of the outside option of inaction is the
only di¤erence from CS.
1.4 Equilibria
This section provides a full characterization of the equilibria of this model.
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). As in CS, every equilibrium in
this model is characterized by a nite partition.
A strategy for S is a function m () that associates each state  with the message m () used
by S in that state. A strategy for R is a function a (m) that associates each message m with
the decision a (m) selected by R given that message. A belief for R is a function  (jm), where
 (jm)  0 and R2[0;1]  (jm) = 1, that gives Rs posterior as a function of m by Bayes rule.
First, we are going to show that every equilibrium is partitional. Let  (N)  (0 (N) ; :::; N (N))
denote a partition of [0; 1] with N steps, where 0 = 0 (N) < 1 (N) < ::: < N (N) = 1. We let
(i 1 (N) ; i (N)) denote the i-th step of partition  (N).
A partition equilibrium with N steps is an equilibrium in which S partitions his informa-
tion into N steps, denoted by  (N), and only reveals which step of  (N) his information lies
in.10 For example, suppose a partition equilibrium with N steps is played, and the state is
10Precisely, a partition equilibrium in this paper is a monotone partition equilibrium where S does not mix among
7 2 (i 1 (N) ; i (N)). S only reveals that the state is in the i-th step. Given the information
revealed by S, R updates his belief about the state  using Bayes rule, and selects his optimal
action a 2 R or the outside option of inaction a = ?.
Lemma 1.1 Consider an equilibrium where R selects an action on the equilibrium path. Every
equilibrium is a partition equilibrium with a nite number of steps.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that in this model, every equilibrium where at least one action is induced
consists of a nite partition. Similar to CS, in such an equilibrium, a nite number of actions are
induced. Because of conict of interest, truthfully revealing the exact state is not an equilibrium.
Two types of partition equilibria may exist in this model. The rst type of partition equilibria
are ones where an action is always taken ("ACTs"). The second type of partition equilibria are
ones where sometimes the outside option of inaction is chosen ("STOPs"). Every ACT is an
equilibrium in CS because inaction is not an option for R in CS.
To ensure that there are no o¤-equilibrium messages, we will follow an approach used by CS
and focus on equilibria where S randomizes as follows. Consider a partition equilibrium with N
steps. Given the state  2 (i 1 (N) ; i (N)), S sends a message m that is randomly drawn from
(i 1 (N) ; i (N)).11
In addition, when there is a STOP with one step (a babbling STOP), there may also exist a
STOP with more than one step such that R always selects inaction given any message, and hence
each players payo¤ is equivalent to that in a babbling STOP for every state. In this case, we
focus on a STOP with one step.12
In any type of equilibrium, when R selects an action in the i-th step, as in CS, his action must
be given by:
a (m) = i 1(N)+i(N)2 for m 2 (i 1 (N) ; i (N)) for i 2 f1; :::; Ng . (3)
Rs ideal decision is action a =  if R knows the state . In a partition equilibrium R selects
messages that imply di¤erent steps unless that the state is at the boundary point between two neighboring steps.
In this paper, when we say a partition equilibrium, we are referring to a monotone partition equilibrium.
11Every m only reveals that the state is in the i-th step of partition  (N). As CSs Theorem 1 shows, all equilibria
given by partition  (N) are essentially equivalent to those with this uniform signaling rule.
12We thank Navin Kartik for pointing out this issue.
8the average of his ideal actions across states in the step, which is denoted by (3), because R only
knows that the state is in the i-th step.
In an ACT with N steps, it is easy to see that the partition must satisfy the same indi¤erence
conditions for S as in CS:
 

i 1(N)+i(N)
2   i (N)  b
2
=  

i(N)+i+1(N)
2   i (N)  b
2
for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g .
(4)
(4) is simplied to:
i+1 (N)  i (N) = i (N)  i 1 (N) + 4b for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g . (5)
Finally, these equilibria di¤er from equilibria in CS only in that we must ensure that R does not
choose inaction, so we require optimality conditions for R:
 (i(N) i 1(N))2
12   uR for i 2 f1; :::; Ng . (6)
(6) is simplied to:
i (N)  i 1 (N) 
p
12uR for i 2 f1; :::; Ng . (7)
Equation (5) means that in an ACT, given b, the higher the state, the wider the step, and the
less precise the information.13 Inequality (7), meaning that R has su¢ cient information about
the state, is necessary for R to always select an action because Rs payo¤ function has a single
peak a = . Each step should be narrow enough that Rs expected payo¤ from his optimal action
exceeds his payo¤ from inaction. Figure 1.1 graphically shows Ss indi¤erence conditions and Rs
optimality conditions in an ACT with N = 4 steps.
In an ACT, given b, the higher the state, the wider the step. On the other hand, Rs payo¤
function has a single peak a =  and depends on the distance between an action and the state
ja  j; R prefers the outside option of inaction to any action if and only if the reported step is
13Since S prefers a higher action than what R actually wants, S has an incentive to declare a higher state than
the true state. In order for S to tell the truth, any rightward step of the partition must be wider than its adjacent
leftward step. Suppose the state is at the boundary point of the partition between two adjacent steps. S has an
incentive to declare he is in the rightward step. In order to prevent S from doing this, R must take a higher action
in the rightward step than S wants. R takes a higher action in the rightward step as the rightward step becomes
wider. The rightward step must be wider than the leftward step, and should be wider as S is more biased or b
increases.
9su¢ ciently wide. Hence, the higher the state, the more Rs willingness to select inaction.14 Hence,
if R selects inaction, he will do so in the N -th step.15
Lemma 1.2 Consider a STOP with N steps such that an action is selected on the equilibrium
path where N  2. Inaction is induced only if the state belongs to the N -th step.
Proof. See Appendix.
In a STOP with N steps where N  2, R will select inaction when S reveals "the state is in
the N -th step" and an action given by (3) otherwise:
a (m)=
8<:
i 1(N)+i(N)
2 for m 2 (i 1 (N) ; i (N)) for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g
? for m 2 (N 1 (N) ; 1) .
(8)
Consequently, Ss indi¤erence condition changes at the (N   1)-th boundary point, N 1 (N).
At N 1 (N), S should be indi¤erent between Rs action in the (N   1)-th step and the outside
option of inaction selected in the N -th step. The indi¤erence condition for S at boundary point
N 1 (N) changes to:
 

N 2(N)+N 1(N)
2   N 1 (N)  b
2
=  uS . (9)
(9) is simplied to:
N 1 (N)  N 2 (N) = 2puS   2b. (10)
But for a STOP with N steps where N  3, Ss indi¤erence conditions at the remaining boundary
points remain unchanged:
i+1 (N)  i (N) = i (N)  i 1 (N) + 4b for i 2 f1; :::; N   2g . (11)
Rs optimality conditions are now:
i (N)  i 1 (N) 
p
12uR for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g , (12)
i (N)  i 1 (N) 
p
12uR for i = N .
14 It is not hard to extend this result to the case where Rs utility function is any decreasing function of ja  j.
15 It is not hard to extend this result to the case where Ss utility function is any decreasing function of ja     bj.
Because of the symmetric property, there does not exist a STOP where an action is induced in the N -th step.
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Recall 0 (N) = 0 and N (N) = 1.
Equation (10) means that when uS is su¢ ciently small compared to b, there does not exist a
STOP with more than one step. In addition, equation (10) determines the width of the (N   1)-
th step and hence all of the previous steps, the rst step through the (N   2)-th step, as well.
Inequalities (12) mean that only the N -th step is wide enough for R to refer the outside option.
So, as in an ACT, the higher the state, the wider the step. Figure 1.2 shows Ss indi¤erence
conditions and Rs optimality conditions in a STOP with N = 4 steps.
We have explained the conditions dening each type of equilibria. The next question is under
what condition does each type of equilibrium exist?
If inaction is unattractive enough for R specically, if uR > 1=12 then the game is equivalent
to CS. More specically, only ACTs exist and the set of ACTs is identical to the set of equilibria
in CS for the same parameter values.
Proposition 1.1 Consider uR 2 (1=12;1) and uS 2 (0;1). For every b:
(1) There is a positive integer NACT (b) such that there is an ACT with N steps for every
N 2 1; 2; :::; NACT (b)	.
(2) There is no STOP.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider uR > 1=12. From Ss indi¤erence condition given by (5), for each b > 0, NACT (b) is
dened by:
NACT (b) =
8><>: 1 for b 2

1
4 ;1

k for b 2
h
1
2(k+1)k ;
1
2k(k 1)

, k  2.
(13)
NACT (b), monotonically decreasing in b, is equivalent to the maximum number of steps in CS.
For uR  1=12, inaction is su¢ ciently attractive to R that he may choose it in equilibrium. In
this case, an ACT exists only if S reveals enough information. This implies that there is a lower
bound for the number of steps for an ACT, in addition to the usual upper bound.
Proposition 1.2 Consider uR 2 (0; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1). There exists an increasing continuous
function g (uR) and a decreasing step function L (uR) over (0; 1=12] such that16:
(1) For b 2 (0; g (uR)], there is an ACT with N steps for every N 2

L (uR) ; N
ACT (b)
	
.
16The formulas for g () and L () are given in the Appendix.
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(2) For b 2 (g (uR) ;1), there is no ACT.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider uR = 1=36 and any uS > 0. Then, ACT does not exist for b > g (1=36)  1=20; an
ACT exists otherwise. If an ACT exists, the lower bound of the number of steps is L(1=36) = 3.
For uR  1=12, STOP also exists; a STOP with one step (i.e. a babbling STOP) always exists.
In addition, multiple STOPs can exist.
Proposition 1.3 Consider uR 2 (0; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1). For every b, there is a positive integer
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) such that there is a STOP with N steps for every N 2

1; 2; :::; NSTOP (b; uR; uS)
	
.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is not hard to show that there exists a STOP with N steps only if b 2 B (N;uR; uS), where
N  2:
B (N;uR; uS) :=
h
max
np
uS  
p
3uR;
p
12uR+2(N 1)puS 1
2(N 1)2
o
;
p
uS
2N 3

for an integer N  2.
(14)
So, (14) is derived from Ss indi¤erence conditions, given by (10) and (11), and Rs optimality
conditions, given by (12). For uR  1=12, there always exists a STOP with one step (a babbling
STOP). We dene B (1; uR; uS) := (0;1).
Thus, NSTOP (b; uR; uS) is given by:
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) := argmax
N
fN 2 Z : b 2 B (N;uR; uS)g (15)
In the proof of Proposition 5, we show that B (N   1; uR; uS)  B (N;uR; uS) for any N given
uR and uS if B (N;uR; uS) exists. That is, when a STOP with N 0 steps exists, a STOP with N
steps also exists for every N 2 f1; 2; :::; N 0g.
Propositions 3 through 5 completely characterize the set of equilibria. The next lemma re-
states the characterization for a xed conict of interest b. This characterization is useful for the
remaining analysis.
Lemma 1.3 Given b, there are two cuto¤s uR = C (b) and uR = 1=12 such that:17
(1) For uR 2 (0; C (b)), only STOPs exist.
(2) For uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12], both STOPs and ACTs exist.
17C (b) is increasing in b and C (b) 2 (0; 1=12). The formula for C () is given in the Appendix.
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(3) For uR 2 (1=12;1), only ACTs exist.
Proof. The result directly follows from Propositions 3 through 5.
For uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12], there is a lower bound L (uR) for the number of steps for an ACT;
and NSTOP (b; uR; uS)  NACT (b). For uR 2 (1=12;1), the result is equivalent to CS. Figure 1.3
depicts Lemma 6.
For uR  1=12, in addition to STOPs mentioned in this section, there can exist mixed strategy
equilibria where R randomizes between taking an action and selecting an outside option in the
last step. We will not focus on these mixed strategy equilibria because they are not generic.18
1.5 Ex-ante Best Equilibrium in This Model
Section 4 shows the existence of multiple equilibria in this model. This section explains which
equilibrium is the best for each player based on his ex-ante expected payo¤s.
In CS, when there are multiple equilibria, both R and S strictly prefer equilibrium information
partitions with more steps. (See CSs Theorem 3 and Theorem 5.) The result in this model di¤ers
from the result in CS because there are two types of partition equilibria in this model.
Let USTOPj (N) denote the ex-ante expected payo¤s of player j=R;S; and let 
STOP
i (N)
denote the i-th boundary point in an STOP with N steps. So:
USTOPR (N) =
N 1P
i=1
 (STOPi (N) STOPi 1 (N))
3
12   uR 
 
STOPN (N)  STOPN 1 (N)

, (16)
USTOPS (N) =
N 1P
i=1

 (STOPi (N) STOPi 1 (N))
3
12   b2 
 
STOPi (N)  STOPi 1 (N)

 uS 
 
STOPN (N)  STOPN 1 (N)

,
(17)
where:
STOPi (N)  STOPi 1 (N) = 2
p
uS   2 (2N   1  2i)  b for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g ,
STOPN (N)  STOPN 1 (N) = 1 
N 1P
i=1
(i (N)  i 1 (N)) .
(18)
Let UACTj (N) denote the ex-ante expected payo¤s of player j=R;S; and let 
ACT
i (N) denote
18For example, S partitions the state space into N steps. If S announces that  belongs to the N -th step, R
randomizes between an action (N 1 (N) + 1)=2 and the outside option with probabilities  and 1  . Otherwise,
R selects an action (i 1 (N) + i (N))=2. Rs optimality condition requires
p
12uR = 1   N 1 (N) since R
randomizes in the N -th step. Ss indi¤erence condition at N 1 (N) requires ((N 1 (N)  N 2 (N))=2 + b)2 =
((1   N 1 (N))=2   b)2 + (1   )uS . Thus, given b, there can exist a mixed strategy equilibrium with N steps
for at most a single (uR; uS) pair.
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the i-th boundary point in an ACT with N steps. So:
UACTR (N) =
NP
i=1
 (ACTi (N) ACTi 1 (N))
3
12 , (19)
UACTS (N) = U
ACT
R (N)  b2, (20)
where:
ACTi (N)  ACTi 1 (N) = iN   2 (N   i)  i  b for i 2 f1; :::; N   1g . (21)
Holding xed the type of equilibrium, every players ex-ante expected payo¤s are increasing
with the number of steps.
Lemma 1.4 Fix any b > 0, uR > 0 and uS > 0. Then,
(1) Each player j=R,S always strictly prefers an ACT with more steps to an ACT with fewer
steps.
(2) Each player j=R,S always strictly prefers a STOP with more steps to a STOP with fewer
steps.
Proof. See Appendix.
When there are multiple ACTs, the welfare comparison among them is the same as in CS
because an ACT is equivalent to an equilibrium in CS. When there are multiple STOPs, the welfare
comparison among them is implied by Ss indi¤erence conditions and Rs optimality conditions.
Ss indi¤erence conditions (10) and (11) x the widths of steps where an action is induced. Hence,
in order to move from a STOP with N steps to a STOP with N + 1 steps, we make the last step
narrower and include an acting step as the new rst step; and the new rst step is preferred by
both players to the outside option. Hence, both players prefer a STOP with N + 1 to a STOP
with N steps.
Within the same type of partition equilibria, an equilibrium with the maximum number of
steps is the best for both players. However, as shown in Section 4, given any b, there is a region,
given by uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1), where both types of equilibria exist. In this region,
we observe NSTOP (b; uR; uS)  NACT (b), and R is better o¤ in an ACT with NACT (b) steps
than a STOP with NSTOP (b; uR; uS) steps.
Proposition 1.4 Fix any b > 0, uR > 0 and uS > 0. The best equilibrium for R is an equilibrium
with the maximum number of steps. If both types of equilibria have the same number of steps
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NSTOP (b; uR; uS)=NACT (b), the best equilibrium for R is an ACT with NACT (b) steps.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1.4 depicts the type and the number of steps of the best equilibrium for R.
Interestingly, the above does not hold for S. Unlike R, more information transmission does
not always make S better o¤. Consider uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1). If uS is small (i.e.,
Ss benet from the outside option of inaction,  uS , is large), we observe NSTOP (b; uR; uS) <
NACT (b). But S is better o¤ in a STOP with NSTOP (b; uR; uS) steps than in an ACT with
NACT (b) steps.
Proposition 1.5 Fix any b > 0. There exist cuto¤s w (b) 2 (0;1) and C (b) 2 (0; 1=12) such
that:
(1) If uS 2 (0; w (b)) and uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12], the best equilibrium for S is a STOP with
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) steps.
(2) Otherwise, the best equilibrium for S is an equilibrium of the maximum number of steps.
If both types of equilibria have the same maximum steps, i.e., NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = NACT (b), the
best equilibrium for S is an ACT with NACT (b) steps.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1.5 depicts the type and the number of steps of the best equilibrium for S.
In summary, R always strictly prefers an equilibrium with more steps to an equilibrium with
fewer steps, but S may not.
1.6 Comparative Statics
This section shows that the relationship between the maximum number of steps and the conict
of interest over actions is non-monotonic.
We interpret the number of steps in an equilibrium as a measure of informativeness for several
reasons.19 First, we focus on information received by R. As Section 5 shows, Rs ex-ante expected
payo¤ is increasing in the number of steps. Hence it seems reasonable to say that more steps is
giving R more information.20
19Our measure of informativeness is di¤erent from standard measures such as Blackwell informativeness.
20 In CS, using the number of steps to measure information transmission seems reasonable because both players
ex-ante expected payo¤s are increasing in the number of steps.
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Second, an equilibrium with the maximum number of steps is the "upper bound" in charac-
terizing the set of all equilibria and so is of natural interest.
Therefore, when there are multiple equilibria, we will focus on an equilibrium with the maxi-
mum number of steps.21
From now on, we let N(b; uR; uS) denote the maximum number of steps in an equilibrium
partition in this model, where:
N(b; uR; uS)=
8>>>><>>>>:
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) if uR 2 (0; C (b))
max

NACT (b) ; NSTOP (b; uR; uS)
	
if uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12]
NACT (b) if uR 2 (1=12;1) .
(22)
N(b; uR; uS) is a measure of the maximum level of information transmission.
We also let NCS (b) denote the number of steps in the most informative partition equilibrium
in CS. Recall NCS (b) = NACT (b), where NACT (b) is dened by (13) in Section 4.
1.6.1 Non-Monotonic Relationship between Conict of Interest and Information
Transmission
In the presence of the outside option, the equilibrium structure is determined by Rs optimality
conditions as well as Ss indi¤erence conditions, as shown in Section 4. These two conditions drive
the main result that information transmission, as measured byN(b; uR; uS), can be non-monotonic
in the conict of interest, b.
In a partition equilibrium, S must be indi¤erent at each boundary point of the equilibrium
partition. Suppose that a partition equilibrium with N steps exists given some level of conict of
interest b. If S observes the state at the i-th boundary point for i 2 f1; 2; :::; N   1g, S should be
21A di¤erent rationale for focusing on the equilibrium with the maximum number of steps could, in principle,
be an equilibrium renement such as NITS (Chen, Kartik and Sobel 2008) or neologism-proofness (Farrell 1993).
Unfortunately, these notions do not isolate the equilibrium with the largest number of steps in this model, even
though they do in CS.
Farrell (1993) and Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008) stated that standard equilibrium renements for signaling games
had no power to rene equilibrium in a cheap talk model because any equilibrium outcome could be supported with
an equilibrium where all messages were sent on the path. And, Farrell dened neologism proofness, which selects an
equilibrium that admits no-selfsignaling set. As Farrell argued, neologism proof equilibrium does not always exist
in CS and hence in this model especially for uR < 1=12. And, Chen, Kartik and Sobel identied NITS that selected
an equilibrium where given  = 0, S weakly prefers the outcome to credibly revealing  in CS. Unlike in CS, NITS
does not always select among equilibria in this model due to the presence of the state independent outside option.
Suppose Ss payo¤ from the outside option, uS , is su¢ ciently large such that a STOP with two steps exist, but is
also su¢ ciently small that S prefers the outside option to an action b given the state  = 0. A babbling STOP and
a STOP with two steps satisfy NITS.
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indi¤erent between reporting "the i-th step" and "the i+ 1-th step." However, if b decreases but
the partition remains unchanged, S is not indi¤erent any more at any boundary point. Hence, if b
decreases, the partition should be adjusted so that S is indi¤erent at every boundary point again.
Understanding how the partition is adjusted to restore indi¤erence helps explain the relationship
between information transmission N(b; uR; uS) and conict of interest b.
First, consider CS given some b such that NCS (b) = 3. Ss indi¤erence conditions decide how
the equilibrium partition is adjusted to a decrease in b. For S to be indi¤erent at each boundary
point, the right step should be larger than the left step by 4b because S is biased towards a larger
action.
Suppose S is less biased (i.e., b decreases). For an equilibrium with three steps to exist,
di¤erence between two steps with an adjacent to each other should be smaller; every boundary
point shifts right, as shown in Figure 1.6.
Hence, for some b0 (< b), we can add a step to the partition (i.e., NCS (b0) = 4) so that S
is indi¤erent at every boundary point. Therefore, in CS, the larger the conict of interest, the
smaller the maximum number of steps.
The relationship between NCS (b) and b is monotonic as shown in Figure 1.7.
However, in this model, the result can be di¤erent when the outside option of inaction is
protable for R, that is, uR is small, because Rs optimality conditions also a¤ect the equilibrium
structure. Consider uR, uS and b, for which there is no ACT and the most informative equilibrium
is a STOP with three steps so N (b; uR; uS) = 3.22 Rs optimality condition requires the width of
the last step to be anything wider than
p
12uR.
Suppose S is less biased (i.e., b decreases). For S to be indi¤erent at every boundary point in
a STOP, as in CS, the boundary point should shift right. For some b0(< b), the last step can be
less than
p
12uR, as shown in Figure 1.8. R selects an action in the last step, but this makes S
not indi¤erent any more at the last boundary point. We need to remove a step from the partition;
hence smaller b results in smaller N (b; uR; uS).23
Of course, as in CS, smaller b can result in larger N (b; uR; uS). Therefore, in this model, the
smaller conict of interest may lead to a smaller or larger maximum number of steps, as shown
22 In other words, given uR, uS and b, an ACT with NCS (b) steps exists in CS, but does not in this model. If we
consider an ACT with NCS (b) steps in this model, at least one player deviates.
23 In this case, we take uR and uS to be that there is no ACT given b0 as well as b.
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in Figure 1.9. The relationship between N (b; uR; uS) and b is not monotonic.
Proposition 10 shows the region in the uRuS-plane where the non-monotonic relationship
between information transmission N (b; uR; uS) and conict of interest b is observed.
Proposition 1.6 Fix any uR > 0 and uS > 0. Then, there exists an increasing continuous
function h (uR) over (0; 1=12] such that:
(1) N (b; uR; uS) is not monotonically decreasing in b for uS 2 (h (uR) ;1) and uR 2 (0; 1=12).
(2) Otherwise, N (b; uR; uS) is monotonically decreasing in b.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 1.10 depicts Proposition 9. Recall that a STOP exists for uR 2 (0; 1=12] and uS 2
(0;1), and does not otherwise.
Non-monotonicity is related to STOPs as we explained above. Figure 1.11 shows an example
where there are both types of equilibria and N (b; uR; uS) is monotonically decreasing in b.
1.6.2 Welfare Implications of Non-Monotonicity
Non-monotonic relationships have interesting welfare implications.
Consider the best equilibrium for each player j=R;S, dened in Section 5. Let Uj (b; uR; uS)
denote the player js ex-ante expected payo¤s in his best equilibrium.
As there is more conict of interest over actions, measured by b, there can be an equilibrium
with more steps, and hence the ex-ante expected payo¤s can be larger for both players.
Lemma 1.5 Uj (b; uR; uS) is not monotonically decreasing in b for j=R and S.
Proof. See Appendix.
Section 5 shows that each players expected payo¤s are increasing with the number of steps
among STOPs, and Section 6.1 shows the maximum number of steps is not always monotonically
decreasing in the level of conict of interest b when a STOP exists. Thus, we can obtain non-
monotonic relationship between each player ex-ante expected payo¤ and conict of interest b.
For example, consider uR = 1=24 and uS = 81=64. Compare di¤erent levels of conict of
interest b = 1=50, b = 1=8 and b = 1.
Given b = 1=50, ACTs exist, and the most informative ACT has ve steps. The ex-ante
expected payo¤s are approximately  0:0065 for R and  0:0069 for S.
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Given b = 1=8 and b = 1, ACT does not exist. Given b = 1=8, there only exists a babbling
STOP. The ex-ante expected payo¤s are  uR =  1=24   0:036 for R and  uS =  81=64 
 1:265 for S. On the other hand, given b = 1, there exists a STOP with two steps. The ex-ante
expected payo¤s are approximately  0:033 for R and  1:201 for S.
Both playersexpected payo¤s are maximized given b = 1=50. But if we compare b = 1=8 and
b = 1, they are better o¤ given b = 1. Figure 1.12 depicts this example.
If a manager can select an expert from a pool of experts including one with very small bias,
the manager prefers the least biased expert. However, if the pool is limited and the manager
cannot nd a very unbiased expert, selecting the least biased expert from the limited expert pool
may not be optimal for the manager.
1.7 Comparison with CS
1.7.1 Di¤erence in the Maximum Number of Steps from CS
This section shows how the presence of an outside option a¤ects communication. We compare
information transmission between this model and CS. For this comparison, it su¢ ces to consider
STOPs because ACTs are equivalent to equilibria in CS.
The next lemma shows the comparison between the maximum number of steps in this model,
N (b; uR; uS), and that in CS, NCS (b).
Lemma 1.6 Fix any b > 0, uR > 0 and uS > 0. Then, N (b; uR; uS)  NCS (b) + 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma provides an upper bound for the maximum number of steps that is above NCS (b).
This upper bound is reached for some parameters where STOP exists. For example, consider b = 1
and uS = 81=64. Take uR such that 1=4 <
p
12uR < 3=4. In CS, the maximum number of steps is
one (i.e., NCS (b) = 1). In this model, the maximum number of steps is two (i.e., N (b; uR; uS) = 2)
where the boundary point is at  = 1=4 and R selects inaction in the last step.
Why does this change in the maximum number of steps occur? Suppose S is very biased (i.e.,
b is large). Specically, suppose b is just large enough that only a babbling equilibrium exists in
CS. In this model, S can still convey information. To see this, suppose S uses one of two messages,
"small" and "large," that R selects the outside option of inaction in response to "large." When
the state is low, S prefers Rs action in response to "low" to the outside option of inaction because
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the outside option is not very protable for S. When the state is high, S prefers the outside option
of inaction to Rs action in response to "low" because Rs action is too low. S honestly sends two
messages separately dependent on the state.
We consider uR 2 (0; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1) where a STOP exists and dene three sets of
(uR; uS) pairs, LA (b), EQ (b) and SM(b), given b such that:
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = N
CS (b) + 1 for (uR; uS) 2 LA (b) ,
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = N
CS (b) for (uR; uS) 2 EQ (b) ,
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) < N
CS (b) for (uR; uS) 2 SM (b) .
(23)
These sets show that the maximum number of steps among STOPs is larger, equivalent or smaller
than the maximum number of steps in CS for the same b. EQ (b) and SM (b) exists for any b,
and LA (b) exists for some b.
Proposition 1.7 Take any integer k  1. There exist cuto¤s bk+1, ck and bk, where bk+1 < ck 
bk , such that24:
(1) For b 2 (bk+1; ck), LA (b), EQ (b) and SM (b) are nonempty.
(2) For b 2 (ck; bk ), only EQ (b) and SM (b) are nonempty.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figures 1.13 and 1.14 illustrate Proposition 13. Take the conict of interest b to be NCS (b) =
k in CS. Then, in this model, NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = k + 1 for (uR; uS) 2 LA (b). As mentioned in
Section 4, when both STOPs and ACTs exist, i.e., uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1), we observe
NACT (b)  NSTOP (b; uR; uS).
There are two important observations in Figure 1.13. For (uR; uS) 2 LA (b), only STOPs
exist, and values of uR and uS are not extremely small or large. In other words, information
transmission is improved when Rs payo¤ from the outside option is relatively large, but every
playerspayo¤ from the outside option is not extremely small or large.
Figures 1.15 and 1.16 show N (b; uR; uS) for a specic example. Consider the following two
cases, (i) b 2 (1=12; 1=8) and (ii) b 2 (1=8; 1=4). In both cases, the maximum number of steps is
24bk is derived from (13). Thus, in CS, NCS (b) = k if b 2 (bk+1; bk ). We found the following relations:
0 < bk+1 < ck < bk < 1 for k  2 and 0 < b2 < c1 = b1 = 1. The formulas for bk and ck are given in the
Appendix.
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two in CS, i.e., NCS (b) = 2. On the other hand, in this model, the maximum number of steps
can be three, i.e., N (b; uR; uS) = 3, for (uR; uS) 2 LA (b).
1.7.2 Welfare Comparison with CS
Section 7.1 shows that the presence of an outside option can increase information transmission
compared to CS. This section explains how this increase in information transmission a¤ects each
players welfare. We compare each players ex-ante expected payo¤s between this model and CS.
This welfare comparison is di¤erent between R and S. This increase in information transmission
is good for R but bad for S.
Recall thatN(b; uR; uS) andNCS (b) denote the maximum number of steps in this model and in
CS, respectively. Recall that, taking the conict of interest to be b 2 (bk+1; ck) for any integer k,
there is a non-empty set LA (b) such that N (b; uR; uS) = NCS (b) + 1 for (uR; uS) 2 LA (b).
First, we take the standard approach of comparing ex ante expected payo¤s. The results for
R and S are given in Figures 1.17 and 1.18, respectively. In each gure, each player is better o¤
in this model in the highlighted area and worse o¤ in the dotted area than in CS.
R is better o¤ when there is more information transmission (i.e., (uR; uS) 2 LA (b)). R is also
better o¤when the outside option is very protable for him (i.e., uR is small). On the other hand,
S is worse o¤ for (uR; uS) 2 LA (b). S is better o¤ only if the outside option is very protable for
him (i.e., uS is small).
Why is the welfare comparison di¤erent between R and S? One potential explanation is that
the presence of an outside option has two e¤ects on each players welfare. The rst one is an
indirect communication e¤ect. The presence of the outside option a¤ects communication, which
a¤ects welfare. The second one is a direct e¤ect, which is each players payo¤ from the outside
option. For (uR; uS) 2 LA (b), the communication e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect for R but not
for S.
To support this explanation, we consider a comparison which we call the greenlighting com-
parison.25 Dene greenlighting statesto be those in which an action is selected in a STOP with
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) steps in this model. By considering only states in which an action is chosen,
this comparison eliminates the direct role of the outside options, leaving only the indirect e¤ect on
25We thank Andrew Newman for suggesting this approach.
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communication. Then, we compare each players welfare across the greenlighting states between
this model and CS. The greenlighting comparison is the same for the two players; both players
are better o¤ in this model than in CS for (uR; uS) 2 LA (b).
1.7.3 Other Non-Monotonic Relationships
Section 6 shows a non-monotonic relationship between the conict of interest b and the maximum
number of steps N(b; uR; uS) given uR and uS . Comparison between this model and CS indi-
cates other non-monotonic relationships. In particular, given b, N(b; uR; uS) is not monotonically
increasing in Rs payo¤s from the outside option  uR (or Ss payo¤s from the outside option
 uS). In other words, R may be able to collect more information by burning money reducing
his payo¤s from the outside option.
Lemma 1.7 Fix b > 0. Then, N (b; uR; uS) is not monotonically decreasing in uR and uS,
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
For example, consider b 2 (1=12; 1=8). As shown in Figure 15, N (b; uR; uS) is not monotonic
in uR xing uS . Specically, the maximum number of steps is N (b; uR; uS) = 3 for uR < C(b)
but N (b; uR; uS)  2 for uR > C(b). N (b; uR; uS) can also increase when uR increases.
Consequently, each players payo¤s in his best equilibrium, Uj (b; uR; uS), may not be monoton-
ically increasing in Rs payo¤s from the outside option  uR (or Ss payo¤s from the outside option
 uS).
Lemma 1.8 Fix b > 0. Then, Uj (b; uR; uS) is not monotonically decreasing in uR and uS,
respectively for each player j=R and S.
Proof. See Appendix.
A small decrease in uR (or uS) has almost no e¤ect on each players payo¤s in the last step.
However, the maximum number of steps N (b; uR; uS) is not monotonic in uR and uS , respectively.
Also, each player is better o¤ in a STOP with more steps as shown in Section 5. Therefore,
reducing uR (or uS) may result in a decrease or increase in N (b; uR; uS), which may make both
players worse o¤ or better o¤.
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1.8 Conclusion
There are three major insights to be gained from adding the outside option of inaction to the
standard cheap talk model. Contrary to CS, conict of interest can facilitate communication. As
the level of conict of interest between a sender and a receiver decreases, the senders incentive
to hide information may increase, which may result in less information transmission between
them. Second, communication may be more informative than in CS. Third, more information
transmission can make the sender worse o¤.
There are many interesting applications for this model. The rst application includes man-
agerial economics such as the design of contracts and organizations. The second includes political
economy such as the design of legislative organization and the reform of redistributive policy. The
third relates to the analysis of communication in markets.
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Figure1.1: ACT with N=4 steps
Figure1.2: STOP with N=4 steps
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Figure1.3: Full characterization of equilibria given Ss bias, b
Figure1.4: Best equilibrium for R given Ss bias, b
Figure1.5: Best equilibrium for S given Ss bias, b
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Figure1.6: Adjustment of equilibrium partition to a decrease in Ss bias, b, in CS
Figure1.7: Monotonicity between the maximum number of steps, NCS (b), and Ss bias, b, in CS
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Figure1.8: Adjustment of equilibrium partition to a decrease in Ss bias, b, in this model (STOP)
Figure1.9: Non-monotonicity between the maximum number of steps, N (b; uR; uS), and Ss bias,
b, in this model given uR=1/36 and uS=1/16
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Figure1.10: Existence of non-monotonicity between the maximum number of steps,
N (b; uR; uS), and Ss bias, b, in this model
Figure1.11: Monotonicity between the maximum number of steps, N (b; uR; uS), and Ss bias, b,
given uR=1/36 and uS=1/100 in this model
Figure1.12: Non-monotonicity given uR=1/24 and uS=81/64 and its welfare implication
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Figure1.13: Comparison between the most informative STOP in this model, NSTOP (b; uR; uS),
and the most informative equilibrium in CS, NCS (b), given Ss bias, bk+1 < b < ck
Figure1.14: Comparison between the most informative STOP in this model, NSTOP (b; uR; uS),
and the most informative equilibrium in CS, NCS (b), given Ss bias, ck < b < bk
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Figure1.15: The maximum number of steps in this model, N (b; uR; uS), given Ss bias,
1=12 < b < 1=8
Figure1.16: The maximum number of steps in this model, N (b; uR; uS), given Ss bias,
1=8 < b < 1=4
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Figure1.17: Welfare comparison between this model and CS for R given Ss bias, b 2 (bk+1; ck)
for some k, where N (b; uR; uS)=NCS (b)+1 for (uR; uS) 2 LA(b)
Figure1.18: Welfare comparison between this model and CS for S given Ss bias, b 2 (bk+1; ck)
for some k, where N (b; uR; uS)=NCS (b)+1 for (uR; uS) 2 LA(b)
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1.9 Appendix
Dene a continuous function g (uR) and a step function L (uR) over (0; 1=12]:
L (uR) := k such that uR 2

1
3(k+1)2
; 1
3k2

, any integer k  2: (24)
g (uR) :=
L(uR)
p
12uR 1
2L(uR)(L(uR) 1) . (25)
Dene a cuto¤ C (b):
C (b) :=

2L(uR)(L(uR) 1)b+1
L(uR)
p
12
2
; (26)
where C (b) is derived from g (uR) and L (uR) such that:
b > g (uR), uR < C (b) .
Dene a function h (uR) over (0; 1=12]:
h (uR) :=

L(uR)(L(uR) 2)
p
12uR+1
2L(uR)(L(uR) 1)
2
(27)
Dene bN and cN :
bN :=
1
2(N 1)N for N  2;
cN :=
1
2(N 1)(N+2) for N  2;
(28)
and c1 = b1 =1. Thus, 0 < bN+1 < cN < bN <1 for any integer N  2.
It is useful to dene the following sets, which are exclusive and exhaustive:
RSTOP (b) := f(uR; uS) : 0 < uR < C (b) ; 0 < uS <1g ;
RBOTH (b) := f(uR; uS) : C (b) < uR < 1=12; 0 < uS <1g ;
RACT (b) := f(uR; uS) : 1=12 < uR <1; 0 < uS <1g :
(29)
Hence, only STOPs exist for (uR; uS) 2 RSTOP (b), both STOPs and ACTs exist for (uR; uS) 2
RBOTH (b), and only ACTs exist for (uR; uS) 2 RACT (b).
It is useful to dene sets (N ; b) such that xing b, a STOP with N steps exists if (uR; uS) 2
(N ; b):
(1; b) := (0; 1=12] (0;1)
 (N ; b) := f(uR; uS) : b 2 B (N;uR; uS)g .
(30)
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Thus, (uR; uS) 2 (k; b) if and only if:
b  (2k   3) < puS  min
n
b+
p
3uR;
2(k 1)2b+1 p12uR
2(k 1)
o
:
(N ; b) is given by an area within an acute triangle in the uR; uS plane. Recall that xing uR
and uS , a STOP with N steps exists if b 2 B (N;uR; uS). Hence, LA (b) = 
 
NCS (b) + 1; b

,
EQ (b) = 
 
NCS (b) ; b

and SM (b) =
NCS(b) 1S
N=1
(N ; b) :
Proof of Lemma 1
Let aj () denote an optimal action of player j=R,S given , where aR () =  and aS (jb) = +b.
Let U j (a; ) denote the ex-post payo¤ of player j=R,S given a and .
If inaction is not selected in equilibrium, it su¢ ces to show the following claim.
Claim 1 The set of actions induced in equilibrium is nite.
Suppose S does not induce R to select inaction in any state. CSs Lemma 1 holds, that is, the
equilibrium is given by a nite partition. Next, suppose S induces R to select inaction given some
state. Because, for j=R,S, U j1 = 0 for some a, U
j
11 < 0 and U
j
12 > 0, and because a
S (jb) 6= aR ()
for all , the argument in CSs Lemma 1 applies; the set of actions induced in equilibrium is nite.
Thus, Claim 16 holds.
If inaction is selected in equilibrium, it is useful to show the following claim.
Claim 2 The set of states in which the same action is induced is connected.
From Claim 16, if an action is induced in equilibrium, the support of the action is bounded.
Because UR
 
aR () ; 

> UR (?; ) in any state, R does not select inaction under perfect infor-
mation; the support of states inducing inaction should be nondegenerate. Suppose action a is
induced given  and 0, where  < 0. This reveals that S prefers action a to inaction given  and
0; Ss utilities is strictly concave in ; S strictly prefers action a to inaction given any " 2  ; 0.
Thus, we have shown that a set of states in which S induces R to take the same action is connected.
Thus, Claim 17 holds.
Hence, if S induces R to select inaction in equilibrium, its support can only include a dis-
connected set of states or/and nite degenerate states at boundary between elements inducing
actions.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose S induces inaction at boundary point  = i 1 and induces an action given  2 (i 1; i),
where i 1 < i. Because the set of states in which the same action is induced is connected, R takes
an action (i 1 + i) =2 given a messagem 2 (i 1; i). By continuity of Ss utility function, S must
be indi¤erent between inaction and action (i 1 + i) =2 at  = i 1; otherwise, S deviates and
induces inaction if the true state is  = i 1+" . Because b > 0, Rs response is closer to Ss optimal
action given  = i 1 than  = i, i.e.
(i 1 + i) =2  aS (i 1) < (i 1 + i) =2  aS (i). If
S is indi¤erent between inaction and action (i 1 + i) =2 given  = i 1, there always exists
" > 0 such that S strictly prefers inaction to action (i 1 + i) =2 given  2 (i   "; i). This is
a contradiction. Hence, when S induces R to take inaction given a set of states in equilibrium,
this set should include  = 1. We have already shown that the set of states inducing inaction is
nondegenerate. Thus, Lemma 2 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
From Ss indi¤erence conditions dened by (5), the width of the i-th element is increasing in i; the
wider element results in lower expected payo¤ for R; Rs expected payo¤ is the lowest in the N -th
element. R does not select inaction given any message if R does not givenm 2 (N 1 (N) ; N (N))
because (1  N 1 (N))2 =12  1=12 for uR > 1=12. Hence, the game is equivalent to CS.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that an ACT with N steps exists. Rs optimality condition requires N (N) N 1 (N) 
p
12uR, and Ss indi¤erence condition requires N (N)  N 1 (N) = 1=N + 2 (N   1)  b. Hence,
for existence, the following inequality should hold:
1=N + 2 (N   1)  b  p12uR, (31)
(31) derives L (uR) and g (uR) as dened in (24) and (25) such that L (uR)  NACT (b) for
b  g (uR), and L (uR) > NACT (b) otherwise. Hence, for b  g (uR), there exists an ACT with N
steps for every N 2 L (uR) ; NACT (b)	. For b > g (uR), there is no ACT.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Consider uR 2 (0; 1=12]. A STOP with N = 1 step exists for any b > 0. Thus, NSTOP (b; uR; uS)
is well dened for any b, uR and uS .
Next we will show multiplicity. We need to derive sets B (N;uR; uS), where N  2. Suppose
a STOP with N  2 steps exists whose partition is denoted  (N). Ss indi¤erence conditions,
(10) and (11), dene 1 (N):
1 (N) = 2
p
uS   2b  (2N   3) ; (32)
The rst step should exist (i.e., 0 < 1 (N)). Thus, the upper bound for b is dened:
b <
p
uS=(2N   3). (33)
Rs optimality conditions, (12), require:
2
p
uS   2b 
p
12uR  1  2 (k   1)  puS + 2 (k   1)2  b, (34)
which denes a lower bound for b:
max
np
uS  
p
3uR;
p
12uR+2(N 1)puS 1
2(N 1)2
o
 b. (35)
Hence, for N  2, a set B (N;uR; uS) is derived as dened in (14) in Section 4.
It su¢ ces to show the following claim.
Claim 3 Consider uR 2 (0; 1=12]. Suppose that there exists a set B (N;uR; uS) for some integer
N  2. Then, there exists a set B (N   1; uR; uS) where B (N;uR; uS)  B (N   1; uR; uS).
The claim holds forN = 2 because the denition of sets B implies B (2; uR; uS)  B (1; uR; uS).
We will show that the claim holds for N  3. Fix b > 0. Suppose that there exists a STOP
with N  3 steps whose partition is denoted  (N). This partition satises conditions (10), (11)
and (12). Next, consider a partition  (N   1) where i (N   1) = i+1 (N) for i = 1; 2; :::; N   2.
Conditions (10) and (11) are satised, and condition (12) is also satised. This partition  (N   1)
forms a STOP with N   1 steps for the same b. In addition, for N  2, the upper bound of a set
B (N) is strictly decreasing in N . Hence, B (N;uR; uS)  B (N   1; uR; uS).
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Hence, the claim holds for N  2.
Proof of Lemma 7
First, we will show Lemma 7 (1). From the denition of each players payo¤, for any integer
N  2:
UACTj (N) > U
ACT
j (N   1) ,where j = R;S , b 2 (0; bN ) (36)
where UACTS (N) = U
ACT
R (N) b2. Recall that an ACT with N steps exists only if b 2 (0; bN ).
Thus, Lemma 7 (1) holds.
Next, we will show Lemma 7 (2). Consider uR 2 (0; 1=12]. It su¢ ces to show that for any
integer N  2:
USTOPj (N)  USTOPj (N   1) > 0,where j = R;S. (37)
Consider Rs payo¤. For any integer N  2:
USTOPR (N)  USTOPR (N   1) =

 (
STOP
1 (N) 0)
2
12 + uR

 STOP1 (N) > 0, (38)
where the rst equality follows from that
STOPi (N)  STOPi 1 (N) = STOPi 1 (N   1)  STOPi 2 (N   1)
for i = 2; :::; N   1; the last inequality follows from:
0 < STOP1 (N)  0 <
p
12uR:
Consider Ss payo¤. For any integer N  3:
USTOPS (N)  USTOPS (N   1) (39)
=

 (STOP1 (N) 0)
2
12 +
 
uS   b2
  STOP1 (N)
>

 (STOP1 (N) 0)
2
12 +

1  1
(2N 3)2

 uS

 STOP1 (N) > 0,
where the second inequality follows from b 2  0;puS=(2N   3); the last inequality follows from
1 (N)=2
 p
uS   b

. For N = 2:
USTOPS (2)  USTOPS (1) =

 (STOP1 (N) 0)
2
12   b2 + uS

 STOP1 (N) > 0, (40)
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where the last inequality follows from STOP1 (N)   0 = 2
 p
uS   b

> 0. Thus, Lemma 7 (2)
holds.
Proof of Propositions 8 and 9
Consider (uR; uS) 2 RBOTH (b), i.e., both types of equilibria exist. From Lemma 7, it su¢ ces to
compare each players ex-ante expected payo¤ in a STOP with NSTOP (b; uR; uS) steps and that
in an ACT with NACT (b) steps.
Because sets  are derived from sets B, as for sets B, sets  have the following inclusion
relationship:
(N + 1; b)  (N ; b) for any integer N  1: (41)
Hence, NSTOP (b; uR; uS) is given by:
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = argmax
N1
fN : (uR; uS) 2 (N ; b)g . (42)
Next, we can dene functions  (; ; ) and  (; ) as follows:
USTOPR (N) > U
ACT
R (k) if uR <  (uS ; N; k) ,
USTOPS (N) > U
ACT
S (k) if uS <  (N; k) .
(43)
where (uR; uS) 2 (N ; b) , b 2 (0; bk) and:
 (uS ; N; k) :=
s
(k+1)(k 1)b2
3
+ 1
12k2
  2(N 1)(
p
uS (N 1)b)((puS b(N 1))2+b2N(N 2))
3
1+2(N 1)2b 2(N 1)puS ,
 (N; k) :=

uS :  (uS ; k;N) > 0 ,
p
uS 2

(2N   3) b; (N
2 2N+2)b+1=2
N

,
 (uS ; k;N) :=
p
uS
3   3
p
uS
2
4(N 1)  
 
2N2   4N + 3 b2puS
+
 
N2   2N + 2 (N   1) b3 + (k2+2)b24(N 1) + 116(N 1)k2 .
Consider Rs ex-ante expected payo¤s. It su¢ ces to show:
uR > 
 
uS ; N;N
ACT (b)

(44)
for (uR; uS) 2 (N; b) \RBOTH (b) :
This inequality holds as follows. First, uR >  (uS ; N; k) holds for N  k for (uR; uS) 2
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RBOTH (b). Second, RBOTH (b) \(NACT (b) + 1; b) is empty even if (NACT (b) + 1; b) exits.
Consider Ss ex-ante expected payo¤s. Fix any uR 2 [C (b) ; 1=12]. Dene w (b) > 0 such that:
w (b) := 
 
N;NACT (b)

(45)
where N = NSTOP (b; uR; uS) and:
w (b) 2  b; b  2NACT (b)  3 for b 2 (0; 1=12) ,
w (b) 2 (b; b+ 1=4) for b 2 [1=12; 1=4) ,
w (b) = 1=2 + b2 for b 2 [1=4;1) .
We can nd w (b) > 0 for any b as follows. Consider b 2 (0; 1=12), i.e., NACT (b)  3. We can take
uS > 
 
NACT (b) ; NACT (b)

for (uR; uS) 2 
 
NACT (b) ; b

. We can also take su¢ ciently small
uS such that uS < 
 
2; NACT (b)

. Thus, there exists a cuto¤ w (b) 2  b; b  2NACT (b)  3,
i.e., (uR; w (b)) 2 (2; b) n
 
NACT (b) ; b

. That is, for uS < w (b), NSTOP (b; uR; uS) < NACT (b)
holds, and Ss ex-ante best equilibrium is a STOP withNSTOP (b; uR; uS) steps. Similarly, consider
b 2 [1=12; 1=4), i.e., NACT (b) = 2. We can nd w (b) 2 (b; b+ 1=4), i.e., (uR; w (b)) belongs to
interior of a set (2; b). For b 2 [1=4;1), i.e., NACT (b) = 1, we can nd w (b) =  (1; 1) =
1=2 + b2. In summary, for any b, we can take su¢ ciently small uS such that uS < w (b) and
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = 1, i.e., Ss ex-ante best equilibrium is a babbling STOP.
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider uR 2 (0; 1=12]. From denitions of sets B and functions L and g, the following inequality
holds for uR 2 (0; 1=12] and uS 2 (0;1):
g (uR) < inf b
b2B(L(uR)+1)
(46)
For b 2 (0; g (uR)), both STOPs and ACTs exist, and (46) implies NACT (b)  NSTOP (b; uR; uS).
For b 2 (g (uR) ;1), only STOPs exist. Hence, the maximum number of steps N (b; uR; uS) is
well dened such that:
N (b; uR; uS) = N
ACT (b) for b 2 (0; g (uR)) ; (47)
N (b; uR; uS) = N
STOP (b; uR; uS) for b 2 (g (uR) ;1)
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Recall that NACT (b) is decreasing in b, and that NACT (b) = L (uR) if b = g (uR)    at the
limit  & 0. From Claim 14, NSTOP (b; uR; uS) is increasing in b if b < inf b
b2B(NSTOP (b;uR;uS))
and
decreasing in b otherwise.
Hence, if g (uR) < inf b
b2B(L(uR))
holds, we can take  > 0 such that:
N (b; uR; uS) = NACT (b) = L (uR) for b 2 (g (uR)  ; g (uR)) , (48)
N (b; uR; uS) = NSTOP (b; uR; uS) < L (uR) for b 2 (g (uR)  ; g (uR) + ) ,
N (b; uR; uS) = NSTOP (b; uR; uS)  L (uR) for b 2
 
inf b
b2B(L(uR))
; sup b
b2B(L(uR))
!
,
which implies that N (b; uR; uS) is decreasing in b over b 2 (0; g (uR)), increasing in b over b 2
g (uR) ; inf b
b2B(NSTOP (b;uR;uS))

, and is decreasing in b over b 2

inf b
b2B(NSTOP (b;uR;uS))
;1

. Hence,
N (b; uR; uS) is non-monotonic in b if and only if g (uR) < inf b
b2B(L(uR))
holds, where:
g (uR) < inf b
b2B(L(uR))
, uS > h (uR) (49)
Hence, N (b; uR; uS) is non-monotonic in b if and only if uS > h (uR).
Proof of Lemma 11
Let USTOPj (N; b; uR; uS) denote the ex-ante expected payo¤s in a STOP with N steps for player
j = R;S given by equations (16), (17) and (18). USTOPj (N; b; uR; uS) is decreasing in b and
increasing in N .
Proposition 10 implies that for uS 2 (h (uR) ;1) and uR 2 (0; 1=12), we can nd b such that
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) < N
STOP (b+ ; uR; uS) for any  > 0 (i.e., b belongs to the boundary of a set
B (N;uR; uS) for some N). Take such a parameter b and let NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = N . We can nd
 > 0 such that:
Uj (b+ ; uR; uS)  Uj (b; uR; uS) (50)
=
 
USTOPj (N + 1; b; uR; uS)  USTOPj (N; b; uR; uS)

+
 
USTOPj (N; b+ ; uR; uS)  USTOPj (N; b; uR; uS)

> 0
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because
USTOPj (N + 1; b; uR; uS)  USTOPj (N; b; uR; uS) > 0
and
USTOPj (N; b+ ; uR; uS)  USTOPj (N; b; uR; uS)% 0
as  & 0. We can also nd 0 > 0 such that NSTOP (b  0; uR; uS) = NSTOP (b; uR; uS) where
Uj (b; uR; uS) > U

j (b  0; uR; uS). Thus, Uj (b; uR; uS) is decreasing in b over (b  0; b) and
increasing in b over (b; b+ ).
Proof of Lemma 12
Fix b > 0. Suppose that a STOP exists and NSTOP (b; uR; uS)  NCS (b) + 2. The denition of
NCS () implies that for any 1 > 0:
NCS(b)+1P
i=1
(1 + 4 (i  1)  b) > 1. (51)
This implies that for any 1
 
NSTOP (b; uR; uS)

> 0:
NSTOP (b;uR;uS) 1P
i=1
i
 
NSTOP (b; uR; uS)
  i 1  NSTOP (b; uR; uS) > 1, (52)
where
i
 
NSTOP (b; uR; uS)
  i 1  NSTOP (b; uR; uS) = 1  NSTOP (b; uR; uS)+ 4 (i  1)  b:
This contradicts the denition of an equilibrium partition.
Proof of Proposition 13
The denition of sets(N ; b) in (30) implies LA (b) = 
 
NCS (b) + 1; b

, EQ (b) = 
 
NCS (b) ; b

and SM (b) =
NCS(b) 1S
N=1
(N ; b) :
It su¢ ces to show that (N ; b) is non-empty for N 2 1; 2; :::; NCS(b) + 1	. From the den-
ition, we can show that 
 
NCS(b) + 1; b

is non-empty only for b 2 (bN+1; cN ) while (N ; b) is
always non-empty for any N  NCS(b) for any b.
We can also show 
 
NCS(b) + 1; b
  RSTOP (b), but (N ; b)\RSTOP (b) 6= ; and (N ; b)\
RBOTH (b) 6= ; for any N  NCS(b).
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Therefore, LA (b) is not empty only in the region RSTOP (b) for b 2 (bN+1; cN ) for some N ;
LA (b) does not exist for b 2 (cN;,bN ; ) for some N .
Proof of Lemmas 14 and 15
Proposition 13 implies that for any b, we can nd (uS ;uR) such that
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) < N
STOP (b; uR + ; uS)
for any  > 0 or
NSTOP (b; uR; uS) < N
STOP (b; uR; uS + )
for any  > 0 (i.e., (uS ;uR) belongs to the boundary of a set (N ; b) for some N). Thus, Lemmas
14 and 15 are shown applying the approaches in Proof of Lemma 11.
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Chapter 2
Managerial Economics of Cheap Talk1
2.1 Introduction
A key problem in organizations is that decision makers often must rely on privately informed
parties, or experts, whose interests may di¤er from those of the decision makers. Crawford and
Sobel (1982), hereafter CS, pioneered a theory of communication using a cheap talk model and
showed that conict of interest hurts information transmission. Recently, Che, Dessein and Kartik
(2013), hereafter CDK, considered the e¤ect of an outside option with a payo¤ to DM and S which
is independent of Ss information. CDK showed that fully informed S can be tempted to pander
to DMs interest and hide information in order to prevent DM from selecting the outside option.
Unlike CS and CDK, our paper explores the e¤ect of pandering on communications when S is
partially informed. The questions considered in this paper include: If the agentsex ante rankings
over projects do not coincide, how does this conict of interest a¤ect Ss pandering incentive?
Can the presence of the outside option facilitate communication? How can delegation substitute
for communication?
There are a number of applications of our work. A manager in charge of starting a new
project asks an in-house expert for advice on potential projects. A president relies on a policy
expert in selecting a scal reform plan among proposals by di¤erent political parties. An investor
collects information on potential investment products from his investment advisor. A venture
capitalist hears from a startup on the prospects for its new business before deciding how to invest
in the startup. In any of the above, a decision maker relies on an expert for soft or unveriable
information related to his decision. The expert may only partially know which action is the best
for the decision maker. The decision maker may select no action and continue with business as
usual if he does not collect su¢ ciently persuasive information about any action.
1This chapter is joint work with Kaiwen Leong.
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Our basic model considers the following situation. There is a company which is starting a new
project. A manager (DM) is assigned to select and carry out a project. There are two potential
projects, project 1 and project 2. One project will succeed and the other project will fail, and
the prior is that each project is equally likely to be the one which succeeds. DM asks an in-house
expert (S) for advice. S has imperfect unveriable information indicating that one project is
more likely to succeed than the other. For example, this might be Ss impression based on his
experiences. After being briefed by S on the projects, DM carries out one of the two projects or
selects an outside of option of no project and continues with business as usual. DM incurs the
entire cost of a project if he carries out a project. Success of a project benets everyone in the
company, but DM and S have ex-ante biases. DM is biased toward project 1 in the sense that
DM expects a larger benet from project 1 than project 2. Ss ex-ante bias may be in the same
or di¤erent direction from DM.
We show that if the agentsex ante biases are in di¤erent directions, this conict of interest
can reduce Ss incentive to pander and hence facilitate information transmission. Ss pandering
incentive is driven by the outside option and unevenly distributed costs; DM prefers no project
to any project if the cost exceeds the expected benet of any project while S prefers some project
to no project. On the other hand, imperfectly informed S may want to hide information against
his ex-ante preferred project. As a result, Ss ex ante bias and the incentive to pander can a¤ect
Ss information revelation in opposite directions
First, suppose their ex-ante biases are in the same direction, i.e., the agentsex-ante biases
are toward project 1. When Ss information is noisy and for project 2 (i.e., against project 1), for
example, probabilities of success are 40% for project 1 and 60% for project 2, S is tempted to hide
this information. S may still prefer project 1 to project 2 because of his ex-ante bias. Moreover,
S can increase the probability that DM carries out a project by recommending project 1 instead
of project 2 because of DMs ex-ante bias.
Next, suppose their ex-ante biases are in di¤erent directions, i.e., DMs ex-ante bias is toward
project 1 while Ss ex-ante bias is toward project 2. Now, S has a smaller incentive to hide
information. Suppose Ss information is noisy. When his information is for project 1, S may
prefer project 2 because of his ex-ante bias; but recommending project 2 reduces the probability
that DM carries out any project. When his information is for project 2, recommending project 1
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increases the probability that DM carries out a project; but S prefers project 2. In either case, S
is willing to reveal his information. Unlike when their biases are in the same direction, when their
biases are in di¤erent directions, Ss ex-ante bias and his pandering incentive o¤set each other.
Relatedly, when their ex-ante biases are in di¤erent directions, the presence of the outside
option itself can facilitate communication because S is more tempted to hide information against
his ex-ante preferred project without the outside option. On the other hand, when their biases are
in the same direction, the presence of the outside option itself can hurt communication because S
has no incentive to pander without the outside option.
This paper also considers managerial issues such as delegation, interpersonal authority and
disclosure as potential substitutes for communication when Ss pandering incentive is present.
In the basic model, when Ss information is very noisy, there is no information transmission
regardless of whether their ex-ante biases are in the same direction or not. Ss information does
not a¤ect DMs choice of a project. DM never carries out his ex-ante less preferred project even
if S fully reveals his information, which discourages S to reveal information against DMs ex-ante
preferred project. We show that delegation can substitute for communication. We suppose that
DM delegates the selection of a project to S. The result is that delegation can facilitate information
transmission when their ex-ante biases are in di¤erent directions rather than in the same direction.
Unlike in Dessein (2002), DM can have larger benets from delegation the larger the conict of
interest is.
In some settings we can think of S as a manager who wants a certain behavior from his
employee, DM. For example, the manager species an action his subordinate worker should take,
but the worker may disobey and take a di¤erent action or not work hard at all. The manager
may have an incentive to pander to the worker. However, the manager may use interpersonal
authority, which is a kind of punishment, as well as persuasion (communication) (Van den Steen,
2009 and 2010). This paper shows that interpersonal authority can mitigate the negative e¤ect
that pandering has on information transmission. Moreover, S may use interpersonal authority
as a signal instead of a punishment device; conict of interest may lead S to use interpersonal
authority more frequently.
We end this paper by introducing uncertainty about Ss interest/type in the basic model.
This extension is motivated by the larger literature about the e¤ect of disclosure on information
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transmission and welfare. We show that uncertainty about Ss interest increases Ss pandering
incentive and hence hurts communication. This result is di¤erent from the prediction by the
standard cheap talk models without an outside option (Morgan and Stocken, 2003; Dimitrakas
and Saradis, 2005; Li and Madarász, 2008). Our result helps explain why disclosure policies have
been implemented in many settings such as the nancial industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature. Section
3 describes the basic model. Section 4 provides a characterization of equilibria and deals with
a welfare analysis. Section 5 compares a model with delegation and the basic model (without
delegation). Section 6 explores a model with interpersonal authority and persuasion. Section
7 analyzes how disclosure of Ss interest a¤ects communication. Section 8 concludes the paper.
Proofs are in the appendix.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper extends cheap talk models originated by CS. In CS, an uninformed DM relies on a
perfectly informed S for advice before selecting an action from a continuum of actions. Because the
agentsoptimal actions do not coincide, their communication has a partitional form; the partition
is coarser as the conict of interest over the optimal action is larger. Hence conict of interest
hurts communication. This paper includes an outside option in DMs choice set and considers
noise in Ss information in addition to considering discrete states and actions, which leads us to
conclude that conict of interest can facilitate communication.
Our study is related to CDK, who studied the economics of pandering using a cheap talk
model with an outside option.2 They analyzed the e¤ect of the presence of an outside option on
communication between an uninformed DM and a perfectly informed S. They mainly discussed
the case where DM and S have identical preferences over discrete actions, but the payo¤s from
2Brandenburger and Polak (1996) and Maskin and Tirole (2004) also showed that Ss incentive for pandering
can hurt information transmission. Brandenburger and Polak showed that when a corporate manager cares about
his rms short-run stock price, he will distort his investment decision toward what, the market believes, is the best
even if he knows it is not the best for the rms long-run prot. Maskin and Tirole showed that in representative
democracy, politicians may pander to public opinion and select a suboptimal popular policy rather than the right
policy for society so that they will get reelected. In these models, it is actions that are distorted by an informed
agent, not communication directly.
Matthews (1989) and Shimizu (2012, 2013) introduced outside options in alternative ways in cheap talk models
assuming that S instead of DM has an option to selection inaction. Matthews studied a bargaining game including
a veto stage where S can either accept DMs proposal of an action or veto the proposal and select inaction. In
Shimizu, S has an outside option to exit after observing DMs decision.
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the outside option can be di¤erent between DM and S.3 Thus, if the outside option is relatively
protable for DM but not for S, S biases his recommendation toward an action that conditionally
looks better for DM in order to prevent DM from selecting the outside option, even when S knows
some other action makes both agents better o¤. The presence of the outside option can worsen
information transmission. On the other hand, this paper analyzes communication between an
uninformed DM and an imperfectly informed S. The main di¤erence from CDK is that S may
be tempted to hide information against his ex-ante preferred project because his information is
noisy. Ss ex-ante bias and pandering incentive can a¤ect Ss information revelation in opposite
directions when the agentsex-ante biases are toward di¤erent projects.
Our basic model is also related to the theory of discontent in organizations. Landier, Sraer
and Thesmar (2009) showed that larger conict of interest can allow organizations to utilize
information in decision making more e¤ectively. Landier, Sraer and Thesmar studied a costly
signaling model where there is an informed manager and an uninformed worker in the rm. The
informed manager selects a project. But for the project to succeed, the worker should carry it out
by putting in his best e¤orts. Thus, the manager may intentionally select a suboptimal project
for the rm in order to motivate the worker. On the other hand, our main focus is on a costless
signaling model a cheap talk model where there is an uninformed DM and an informed S. DM
selects and implements a project. S may be discouraged to reveal information when DM ignores
Ss advice in selecting a project.
Our model with delegation is related to Dessein (2002). Dessein compared a model with
delegation and a model without delegation based on a standard cheap talk model (without an
outside option). When S is less biased, DM has a larger benet on average in both models. With
delegation, there is a loss of control to DM. Without delegation, there is a loss of information to
DM. Both losses are smaller as S is less biased. But, given a less biased S, DMs benet from
delegation dominates his benet from communication. Conict of interest reduces DMs benet
from delegation. Our model with delegation (with an outside option) shows a di¤erent result that
DMs benet from delegation can be larger as he has larger conict of interest with S.4
3They also consider an extension where DM and S have di¤erent preferences over actions in their supplementary
appendix.
4Our model with delegation is also comparable with models about legislative procedures with a closed rule
discussed by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Austen-Smith (1993), and Krishna and Morgan (2001). In their models,
like in our model, S selects an action; DM decides whether to authorize it or veto it. Their papers focus on
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Chiba and Leong (2013) directly extended CS model (with continuum states and continuum
actions) adding an outside option to DMs choice set. They showed that information transmission
is not monotonic with the level of conict of interest over actions. If the outside option is relatively
protable for DM, DM chooses the outside option when he is recommended a very high action
because it is risky. S may want to avoid this by deviating and recommending a lower action.
Given a smaller conict of interest, DMs response to such a message may be more acceptable to
S. For S not to deviate, he may need to use a coarser partition. On the other hand, this paper
focuses on the e¤ect of conict of interest on Ss pandering incentive by introducing noise in Ss
information and unevenly distributed cost as well as an outside option.
2.3 Model
A decision maker (DM) is in charge of selecting and carrying out a project. He relies on a speaker
(S) for information relevant to his decision.
There are two alternative projects, project 1 and project 2. There are also two states of
nature  2 f1; 2g, which are equally likely. DM decides whether to carry out some project,
denoted P 2 f1; 2g, or not to carry out any project at all, denoted P = ?. A project which is
carried out will succeed and deliver private benet to every agent only if it is adapted to the state
in the sense that P = ; it will fail and deliver zero prot to every agent otherwise.
Carrying out a project entails a non-transferable cost c to DM; carrying out no project entails
no cost. The cost is uncertain ex-ante. Before DM makes his decision, he observes the cost of
a project c, which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0; 1]  R. The
distribution is common knowledge.
Every agent is risk neutral, and maximizes prots. DM obtains private benet 1 when project
1 is carried out and succeeds, and xDM when project 2 is carried out and succeeds, where 1 >
xDM > 0.
There are two cases about Ss interest. We say S has similar interest to DM, denoted t=SIM,
if S obtains private benet 1 when project 1 is carried out and succeeds, and xS when project
2 is carried out and succeeds, where 1 > xS > 0. On the other hand, we say S has di¤erent
committee design with multiple speakers. Our model focuses on the e¤ects of conict of interest on DMs benet
from delegation.
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interest from DM, denoted t=DIF, if S obtains private benet xS when project 1 is carried out
and succeeds, and 1 when project 2 is carried out and succeeds. t is common knowledge.
Given any t, DMs payo¤ is given by:
UDM (P; ; c) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1  c if P =  = 1
xDM   c if P =  = 2
 c if P 2 f1; 2g and P 6= 
0 otherwise.
(1)
Ss payo¤ in the case of t=SIM is given by:
US (P; ; t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if P =  = 1
xS if P =  = 2
0 otherwise
(2)
Ss payo¤ in the case of t=DIF is given by:
US (P; ; t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
xS if P =  = 1
1 if P =  = 2
0 otherwise
(3)
Each agents payo¤ structure is common knowledge.
S observes a binary private signal  2 f1; 2g on the state. The signal is correct (i.e.,  = ) with
precision  2  12 ; 1, and wrong (i.e.,  6= ) otherwise. Signal precision is common knowledge.
The signal is not observed by DM; it is soft and unveriable information.
After privately observing a signal, S sends a message m 2 f1; 2g to DM. Communication is
costless for all agents.
In summary, the timeline is as follows. (Also, see Figure 2.1.)
1. Nature chooses the state  2 f1; 2g.
2. S observes a noisy signal  2 f1; 2g about the state.
3. S sends a cheap talk message m 2 f1; 2g to DM.
4. DM observes the cost of carrying out a project c 2 [0; 1].
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5. DM decides whether to carry out some project, P 2 f1; 2g, or no project, P = ?.
6. The outcome is realized for every agent. The game ends.
2.4 Equilibrium
CDK showed that the presence of the outside option can tempt S to pander to DMs interest
and hurt communication. Like in CDK, this model allows DM to select an outside option of no
project. If the agents have perfect information, they have the same ranking of the two projects.
In addition, we consider uncertainty about projects and unevenly distributed cost of a project.
Therefore, their ex-ante biases may have an impact on their communication. Further questions
arise: does the presence of the outside option still cause S to pander to DMs interest? How does
conict of interest a¤ect the e¤ect of Ss pandering? Can communication be more informative
due to the presence of the outside option?
The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Let  (; t) denote a strategy for
S; this is the probability that S sends m =  conditional on his signal  given his interest t. Let
 (m; t) denote DMs posterior belief; this is the probability which DM assigns to state  = m
after receiving message m, conditional on Ss strategy  (; t) given t:
 (m; t) := Pr ( = mjm; (; t)) . (4)
Let P  (c;m; t) denote DMs strategy conditional on his cost c, messagem and Ss strategy  (; t)
given t.
Without loss of generality, we assume m = 1 makes DM believe that project 1 is more likely
to succeed than m = 2, and m = 2 makes DM believe that project 2 is more likely to succeed
than m = 1:
Pr ( = 1jm = 1;  (; t))  Pr ( = 1jm = 2;  (; t)) , (5)
Pr ( = 2jm = 2;  (; t))  Pr ( = 2jm = 1;  (; t)) .
That is, DMs consistent belief is  (m; t)  12 for any m and t.
We dene two types of informative equilibria, a full revelation equilibrium and a partial reve-
lation equilibrium, as well as a babbling equilibrium. We will show there are no other possibilities
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for equilibria.
In a full revelation equilibrium given any t, S sends m =  (i.e.,  (; t) = 1 for any ) and
DM carries out what S recommends if the benet exceeds the cost (i.e., P  (c;m; t) 2 fm;?g).
In a partial revelation equilibrium given t=SIM, S partially reveals  = 2 by mixing between
two messages (i.e.,  (1; SIM) = 1 and  (2; SIM) 2 (0; 1)). DM carries out what S recommends
if the benet exceeds the cost (i.e., P  (c;m; t) 2 fm;?g).
In a partial revelation equilibrium given t=DIF, S partially reveals  = 1 by mixing between
two messages (i.e.,  (1; DIF ) 2 (0; 1) and  (2; DIF ) = 1). DM carries out what S recommends
if the benet exceeds the cost (i.e., P  (c;m; t) 2 fm;?g).
In a babbling equilibrium given any t, S does not reveal any information (i.e.,  (; t) = 12 for
every ). DM never selects project 2 (i.e., P  (c;m; t) 2 f1;?g).
Figures 2.2 depicts the ow of events in each type of equilibrium.
2.4.1 Equilibrium given t=SIM
First consider t=SIM, i.e., both agentsex-ante biases are toward project 1. We show how the
presence of an outside option leads S to pander to DMs interest and a¤ects communication.
The equilibrium will be explained in three steps: each agents belief, DMs strategy and Ss
strategy.
Each agent updates his belief using Bayesrule. On observing each possible signal , S updates
his belief such that Pr ( = j) = . DMs belief is bounded below from (5) and bounded above
by Ss information such that 12   (m; t)  .5
DM chooses an action based on the cost and Ss message. To clarify our analysis, we decompose
DMs decision in two steps. In the rst step, DM compares the expected benets from the two
projects, ignoring the cost c. We say DM selects project 1 (project 2) if DM expects project 1
(project 2) to be more protable than project 2 (project 1) based on his updated belief. In the
second step, DM carries out the selected project if the cost is below the expected benet of the
selected project. On receiving m = 1, DM selects project 1 because of his ex-ante bias. However,
5Given t=SIM,  (m; t)= for 8m in a full revelation equilibrium,  (1; t) 2 (1=2; ) and  (2; t)= in a partial
revelation equilibrium, and  (m; t)=1=2 for 8m in a babbling equilibrium.
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on receiving m = 2, DM selects project 2 only if:
xDM   (2; t)| {z }
DMs expected benet
from project 2 given m=2
 1  (1   (2; t))| {z } ,
DMs expected benet
from project 1 given m=2
(6)
which is simplied to  (2; t)  11+xDM , and selects project 1 otherwise. Because DM is biased
away from project 2 (i.e., 11+xDM>
1
2), (6) holds only when Ss information is su¢ ciently precise,
i.e.,  > 11+xD , and S reveals su¢ cient information.
Hence, DM selects what S recommends (i.e., P  (c;m; t) 2 fm;?g for any m) if (6) holds. DM
always selects project 1 (i.e., P  (c;m; t) 2 f1;?g for any m) otherwise. In any case, DM carries
out the selected project if the benet exceeds the cost. For example, if DM selects project 1 given
m = 1, DM carries out the project with probability  (1; sim).6
S selects a message considering his benet from each project and how likely DM will carry out
each project. On observing  = 1, S sends m = 1 because both agents are biased toward project
1. On the other hand, on observing  = 2, S sends m = 2 only if (6) holds (i.e., S can a¤ect the
selection of a project) and S expects:
xS  | {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 2
 xDM   (2; SIM)| {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 2| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
 1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1   (1; SIM)| {z } :
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(7)
Given  (1; SIM) =  (2; SIM) =  (i.e., full information revelation), (7) is equivalent to
  11+xDM xS .
Lemma 2.1 Consider t=SIM. There are cuto¤s ASIM , 11+xDM and
1
1+xDM xS such that:
(1) For  2 ( 11+xDM xS ; 1), a full revelation equilibrium exists.
(2) For  2 (maxfASIM ; 11+xDM g; 11+xDM xS ), a partial revelation equilibrium exists.
(3) Otherwise, only babbling equilibria exist.
6Recall that DMs cost is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0,1].
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If there are informative equilibria, their outcomes are unique. Further, if there is an informa-
tive equilibrium, both agents prefer an informative equilibrium to a babbling equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix
There always exists a babbling equilibrium as in the standard cheap talk model, but there may
not exist an informative equilibrium. If an informative equilibrium exists, it is either a full reve-
lation equilibrium or a partial revelation equilibrium dened above. For  2 ( 11+xDM xS ; 1) (i.e., (7)
holds with strict inequality), S is willing to reveal information. For  2 (maxfASIM ; 11+xDM g; 11+xDM xS ),
S partially reveals information by randomizing between two message given  = 2 so that (7) holds
with equality. For  < ASIM (i.e., (7) does not hold), S always prefers project 1 given any . For
 < 11+xDM (i.e., (6) does not hold), DM never selects project 2 even if S fully reveals information.
Lemma 1 refers to two regions in the xSxDM -plane given t=SIM. The rst is for xS 2
(1+xDM2 ; 1) and xDM 2 (0; 1) and the second for xS 2 (0; 1+xDM2 ) and xDM 2 (0; 1). Figure
2.3 depicts Lemma 1.
Both agents will benet from a successful project. Thus, when Ss information is precise (i.e.,
 is high), both agents agree on the selection of a project given Ss information; S is willing to
fully reveal information. DM will carry out a recommended project with a higher probability
when S recommends project 1 than when S recommends project 2.
On the other hand, when Ss information is noisy (i.e.,  is medium), S expects higher benet
from project 1 than project 2 even if his information is  = 2. In addition, recommending
project 1 rather than project 2 increases the probability that DM will carry out a project. Thus,
S is tempted to hide  = 2. Thus, as  decreases, S starts to partially reveal information by
randomizing between two messages given  = 2.
When Ss information is very noisy (i.e.,  is small), communication collapses and only babbling
equilibria exist because S is not willing to reveal information against his ex-ante preferred project
or/and DM ignores Ss message in selecting a project. Especially if DM ignores Ss message in
selecting a project, Ss pandering incentive increases, and communication collapses. Consider an
informative equilibrium where DM only selects project 1 regardless of Ss message. S is tempted
to pander to DMs interest and send m = 1 regardless of his information  because sending m = 1
increases the probability that DM carries out project 1.
If the outside option is removed from the model, a full revelation equilibrium exists for a wider
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range of  because the likelihood of DM carrying out some project is not Ss concern any more.
For example, given xDM = xS (i.e., xS 2 (0; 1+xDM2 )), a full revelation equilibrium exists for any
 without an outside option. Therefore, the presence of the outside option can tempt S to pander
to DMs interest and prevent information transmission.
We also showed that more information makes both agents better o¤ xing t and . DM is
better o¤ as he can collect more information because it helps DM avoid suboptimal decisions
such as carrying out project 1 even if project 2 is more protable and selecting the outside option
even if the most protable projects prot exceeds the cost. S is also better o¤ in an informative
equilibrium because S is willing to reveal information knowing that he can a¤ect DMs selection
of a project.
2.4.2 Equilibrium given t=DIF
Next, consider t=DIF, i.e., DMs ex-ante bias is toward project 1 while Ss ex-ante bias is toward
project 2. This section shows how this conict of interest a¤ects Ss pandering incentive.
The analysis for each agents belief and DMs strategy remains unchanged. It su¢ ces to
analyze Ss strategy. On observing  = 1, S sends m = 1 if he expects:
xS  | {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1   (1; DIF )| {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =1
 1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 2
 xDM   (2; DIF )| {z };
Probability that
DM carries out
project 2| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =1
(8)
which is equivalent to   xDMxS+xDM given  (1; DIF ) =  (2; DIF ) =  (i.e., full information
revelation). (8) does not always hold because S is biased away from project 1.
On observing  = 2, S sends m = 2 if (6) holds (i.e., S can a¤ect the selection of a project).
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If (6) holds, S expects:
1  |{z}
Ss expected
benet from
project 2
 xDM   (2; DIF )| {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 2| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
> xS  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1   (1; DIF ) .| {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(9)
Lemma 2.2 Consider t=DIF. There are cuto¤s ADIF , xDMxS+xDM and
1
1+xDM
such that:
(1) For  2 (maxf xDMxS+xDM ; 11+xDM g; 1), a full revelation equilibrium exists.
(2) For  2

ADIF ;
xDM
xS+xDM

or  2 ( 11+xDM ; 1), a partial revelation equilibrium exists.
(3) Otherwise, only babbling equilibria exist.
If there are informative equilibria, their outcomes are unique. Further, if there is an informa-
tive equilibrium, both agents prefer an informative equilibrium to a babbling equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix
For  2 ( xDMxS+xDM ; 1) (i.e., (8) holds with strict inequality), S is willing to fully reveal infor-
mation. For  2

ADIF ;
xDM
xS+xDM

, S partially reveals information against his ex-ante preferred
project,  = 2, by randomizing between two messages so that (8) holds with equality. For
 < ADIF (i.e., (8) does not hold), S prefers project 2 given any . For  < 11+xDM (i.e., (6) does
not hold), DM never selects project 2 even if S fully reveals information.
Lemma 2 refers to two regions in the xSxDM -plane given t=DIF. The rst is for xS 2
 
x2DM ; 1

and xDM 2 (0; 1) and the second for xS 2
 
0; x2DM

and xDM 2 (0; 1). Figure 2.4 depicts Lemma
2.
Like in the previous case, both agents will benet from a successful project. Thus, when Ss
information is precise (i.e.,  is high), there is full information revelation.
When Ss information is noisy (i.e.,  is medium), S experiences tradeo¤s given each . If
his information is against his ex-ante preferred project (i.e.,  = 1), S still expects higher benet
from project 2, but by recommending project 2 instead of project 1, S decreases the probability
that DM carries out a project. If his information is against DMs ex-ante preferred project (i.e.,
 = 2), recommending project 1 leads DM to carry out a project with a higher probability, but S
prefers project 2.
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When Ss information is very noisy (i.e.,  is small), only babbling equilibria exist as observed
in the case of t=SIM.
If the outside option is removed from the model, a full revelation equilibrium exists for a
narrower range of  because the probability of a project not occurring is not Ss concern any
more. For example, without an outside option, given xS 2
 
0; x2DM

, a full revelation equilibrium
exists for   11+xS and only babbling equilibria exist otherwise, where 11+xS >
xDM
xS+xDM
. Ss
pandering incentive and conict of interest o¤set each other and lead S to reveal information.
Therefore, the presence of the outside option can facilitate information transmission.
An interesting observation is that communication can collapse even if S is willing to reveal
information. Consider xS 2
 
x2DM ; 1

, where xDMxS+xDM <
1
1+xDM
. For  > xDMxS+xDM , S is willing
to fully reveal information if he can a¤ect DMs selection of a project. However, for  < 11+xDM ,
DM ignores Ss recommendation, which discourages S to reveal information.
When there is an informative equilibrium, its welfare implication is the same as in the previous
case, i.e., both agents are better o¤ in a more informative equilibrium.
2.4.3 Conict of Interest and Information Transmission
This section shows that more information is revealed given t=DIF than t=SIM by comparing
results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. We also explain welfare implication of the comparison.
We focus on an informative equilibrium if it exists, and a babbling equilibrium otherwise. That
is, xing , we compare the most informative equilibria given t=DIF and t=SIM, respectively.
This treatment seems reasonable because Lemmas 1 and 2 showed that an informative equilibrium
makes DM and S better o¤ than a babbling equilibrium if it exists.7
We interpret the probability that S reveals his signal as a measure of informativeness for several
reasons. First, we focus on information received by DM. Second, we will show that regardless of
t, DMs ex-ante expected payo¤ is larger as S reveals his information with the larger probability.8
Regardless of t, when Ss information is precise (i.e.,  is high), both agents agree to select
7We follow CSs approach that focuses on the most informative equilibrium, an equilibrium including the maxi-
mum number of steps, in conducting comparative statics analysis. In CS, both agentsex-ante expected payo¤s are
increasing in the number of steps.
A di¤erent rationale for selecting cheap talk equilibria could be an equilibrium renement such as NITS (Chen,
Kartik and Sobel 2008) or neologism-proofness (Farrell 1993). Unfortunately, these notions do not isolate an
equilibrium in this model, even though they may do in CS.
8Our measure of informativeness is di¤erent from standard measures such as Blackwell informativeness.
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a project which is more likely to succeed. Hence, a full revelation equilibrium exists. When Ss
information is noisy (i.e.,  is low), DM ignores Ss recommendation in selecting a project, and/or
S is unwilling to reveal information against his ex-ante preferred project. Hence, only babbling
equilibria exist.
However, Ss information is in the middle range, there is a di¤erence between t=SIM than
t=DIF. Consider t=SIM. Given  = 2 (i.e., Ss information is against both agentsex-ante pre-
ferred project), Ss pandering incentive as well as his ex-ante bias tempts him to hide this infor-
mation. On the other hand, consider t=DIF. Given  = 1 (i.e., Ss information is against his
ex-ante preferred project), Ss ex-ante bias tempts him to hide this information, but his pandering
incentive encourages S to reveal information. Given  = 2 (i.e., Ss information is against DMs
preferred project), Ss pandering incentive tempts him to hide this information, but his ex-ante
bias encourages S to reveal information.
Thus, S is more tempted to hide information given t=SIM than given t=DIF. Conicts of
interest can facilitate communication.9
Proposition 2.1 Given any xS and xD, at least as much information is revealed in the most
informative equilibrium given t=DIF than given t=SIM.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, which identify four key regions in the xSxDM -
plane. The rst is for xS 2 (1+xDM2 ; 1) and xDM 2 (0; 1), the second for xS 2 (x2DM ; 1+xDM2 )
and xDM 2 (0; 1), the third for xS 2
 
2x3DM   xDM ; x2DM

and xDM 2 (0; 1), and the last for
xS 2
 
0; 2x3DM   xDM

and xDM 2 (0; 1). In any region, S reveals the same or strictly more
information given t=DIF than given t=SIM. Figure 2.5 depicts Proposition 3.
The interesting comparison is for  2

ASIM ;
xD
xS+xD

in the last region. In this case, a partial
revelation equilibrium exists given t=SIM as well as t=DIF, i.e., Ss strategy is  (1; SIM) = 1
and  (2; SIM) 2 (0; 1) given t=SIM and  (1; DIF ) 2 (0; 1) and  (2; DIF ) = 1 given
t=DIF. The result is  (2; SIM) <  (1; DIF ), i.e., S reveals more information given t=DIF
than t=SIM.
9The result is not driven by the stochastic nature of DMs cost or the number of projects. We investigated a
model where DMs cost is predetermined and known to every agent. We also studied a model where there are more
than two projects. The result remains unchanged in each model such that there is more information to be revealed
by S given t=DIF than t=SIM. The description, results and proofs for both models are available on request.
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We examine the welfare implication of Proposition 3. Suppose a decision maker (DM) can
select a speaker (S) from a pool of speakers with di¤erent types (i.e., di¤erent levels of conict
of interest compared to DM). Which type (t) of S will benet DM? The answer is that DM can
benet relying on S who has larger conict of interest with DM.
Proposition 2.2 For any xDM and xS, there are cuto¤s A1 and A2, where 12 < A1 < A2 < 1,
such that:
(1) DM prefers t=DIF to t=SIM for  2 (A1; A2).
(2) DM is indi¤erent between t=DIF and t=SIM otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Regardless of t, DM is better o¤as he collects more information. However, the same result may
not hold for S. Alignment of ex-ante biases complements information for S. In a full information
revelation equilibrium, S is better o¤ given t=SIM than given t=DIF. Moreover, S may be better
o¤ in a less informative equilibrium given t=SIM than in a more informative equilibrium given
t=DIF.
We have also considered an extension of the model where S puts costly e¤ort into acquiring
information. Specically, before observing a signal, S can put e¤ort into improving precision of
his signal. The result is that S puts more e¤ort into acquiring information given t=DIF than
t=SIM.10
2.5 Delegation
2.5.1 Model with Delegation
In the previous section, we studied how S panders to DMs interest and hides information. In
this section and Sections 6 and 7, we will consider possible substitutes for communication. This
section discusses delegation.11
Suppose that a senior manager (DM) is in charge of starting a new plant. So, he is looking for
a location for it. If DM asks a local manager (S) for advice and selects the location by himself,
10The description, results and proofs for this extended model are available on request.
11Frank Knight (1921) noted that a managerial hierarchy is a characteristic of the modern business enterprise.
Information related to decisions is dispersed in a hierarchical organization; it is di¢ cult for an owner or top of the
organization to have full and rapid access to relevant information. Hence, delegation has been recognized as an
e¤ective approach to optimize information. Andrew Carnegie said: "No man will make a great business who wants
to do it all himself or to get all the credit for doing it." (Alderson, Bernard. "Andrew Carnegie: The Man and His
Work." New York, NY: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1909. 57.)
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DM may not fully exploit local information from S due to conict of interest and will select a
suboptimal location. If DM delegates the selection of the location to S, S may fully utilize his
information in his decision, but the decision may not be optimal for DM because Ss interest may
be di¤erent from DMs. Hence, there can be a loss of information under communication (non-
delegation) while there can be a a loss of control under delegation.12 Under what circumstances,
will delegation benet DM? To answer the question, we compare two models, a model with
delegation and our basic model (without delegation).13
In the model with delegation, on observing signal  2 f1; 2g, S selects one project and reports
his selection to DM, i.e., S selects mD 2 f1; 2g. Then, DM decides whether to carry it out or
not. DM still incurs the entire cost of a project. Now DM cannot carry out a project that is not
recommended by S, i.e., DMs decision is P 2 mD;?	.
In the basic model (without delegation), DMs choice set is not a¤ected by Ss recommendation,
i.e., DM selects P 2 f1; 2;?g.
Here we show the result given xDM = xS = x.
As in the basic model, we dene a full revelation equilibrium, a partial revelation equilibrium
and a babbling equilibrium as follows. In a full revelation equilibrium in the case of any t, S
selects mD =  for 8. In a partial revelation equilibrium in the case of t=SIM (t=DIF ), S mixes
between two projects for  = 2 ( = 1) so that he is indi¤erent while S selects mD =  for
 = 1 ( = 2). In a babbling equilibrium in the case of t=SIM (t=DIF), S always select mD = 1
(mD = 2) regardless of .
2.5.2 Delegation versus Communication
In the model with delegation, S can select a project. On the other hand, in the basic model
(without delegation), in every informative equilibrium, S knows that his message a¤ects DMs
selection of a project. Thus, for values of  where an informative equilibrium exists in the
basic model, delegation does not a¤ect Ss information revelation or the level of optimization
12Richard E. Krafve, Vice President for Ford Motor Company, said: "You can delegate authority, but you can
never delegate the responsibility for delegating a task to someone else. If you pick the right person, ne, but, if you
picked the wrong person, the responsibility is yours-not theirs." (Gookin, John. "Wilderness Wisdom: Quotes for
Inspirational Exploration." Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2012. 95.)
13The model with delegation is related to a costly signaling model by Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2009). They
focused on how the agents ex-ante biases a¤ect costly communication. On the other hand, we focus on how
delegation substitutes for costless communication comparing the two models.
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of information in decision making. Thus, it su¢ ces to focus on the case where only babbling
equilibria exist in the basic model.
Section 4 showed that S has a smaller incentive to hide information given t=DIF than t=SIM,
but for small , there is no informative equilibrium given any t.
Given t=DIF, there is no informative equilibrium without delegation for  2 (12 ; 11+x) because
DM ignores Ss recommendation in selecting a project. S is willing to fully reveal information if
S can a¤ect DMs selection of a project, but DMs ignorance increases Ss pandering incentive
and discourages S from revealing information. Suppose that DM only selects project 1 in an
informative equilibrium. S is tempted to pander to DMs interest and send m = 1 regardless of
his information  because sending m = 1 increases the probability that DM carries out project 1.
Given t=SIM, there is no informative equilibrium without delegation for  2 (12 ; ASIM ) because
of Ss unwillingness to reveal information as well as DMs ignorance.
Thus, given t=DIF, we observe a di¤erent level of information revelation in the model with
delegation from that in the basic model. But we do not observe any di¤erence given t=SIM.
Lemma 2.3 Fix x. Then:
(1) Given t=SIM, there is a full revelation equilibrium for  2

1
1+x2
; 1

, a partial revelation
equilibrium for  2

ASIM ;
1
1+x2

, and only babbling equilibria otherwise.
(2) Given t=DIF, there is a full revelation equilibrium for every .
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2.6 compares models with and without delegation. Given t=SIM, delegation does not
change information revelation for any . On the other hand, given t=DIF, delegation improves
information revelation for  2

1
2 ;
1
x+1

and does not cause any change otherwise.
Consider t=DIF for  2

1
2 ;
1
x+1

. Without delegation, DM always prefers project 1 to
project 2 and selects project 1 even if S fully reveals information, which discourages S and causes
a loss of information. With delegation, S fully reveals information by selecting a project based on
his information (i.e., mD =  for any ), which prevents DMs loss due to lack of information.
However, DM is prevented from selecting project 1 given  = 2 even if project 2 is more protable
for DM. Thus, if Ss information is relatively precise (i.e.,  2 ( 1p
2(1+x2)
; 1x+1), DMs gain of
facilitated information revelation dominates DMs loss of control. But if Ss information is very
noisy (i.e.,  2 (12 ; 1p2(1+x2))), the loss dominates the gain.
59
Proposition 2.3 Delegation makes DM better o¤ for  2 ( 1p
2(1+x2)
; 1x+1) and worse o¤ for
 2 (12 ; 1p2(1+x2)) and does not change DMs ex-ante expected payo¤ otherwise given t=DIF. On
the other hand, delegation does not change DMs ex-ante expected payo¤ given t=SIM for any .
Proof. See Appendix.
The result is contrasted with the observation in Dessein (2002). In Dessein (without an outside
option), the larger the conict of interest, the smaller the benet delegation brings to DM. In our
model (with an outside option), the larger the conict of interest, the larger (or the smaller) the
benet delegation brings to DM. We also showed how the level of noise in Ss information (i.e.,
) a¤ects the benet delegation brings to DM, which was not considered by Dessein.
We showed that delegation can benet DM if Ss information is noisy. This result can be
interpreted to show that delegation is benecial to organizations experiencing uncertainty about
their business. This interpretation is consistent with empirical studies by Acemoglu et al. (2007),
Colombo and Delmastro (2004), and Graham et al. (2013). Acemoglu et al. theoretically and
empirically showed that young rms, i.e., rms dealing with new technologies, were more likely
to delegate authority to managers than old rms. Colombo and Delmastro surveyed Italian
manufacturing rms and showed that at the plant level, rms more frequently delegate decision-
making authority to plant managers when the plant is large and complex. Graham et al. surveyed
U.S. based companies and showed that CEOs are more likely to delegate decision-making authority
to senior managers when the rm is large and complex.
2.6 Interpersonal Authority
2.6.1 Model with Interpersonal Authority
The previous section showed that delegation can mitigate the negative e¤ect of pandering on infor-
mation transmission. This section considers interpersonal authority as an alternative approach.14
We study a model in which a manager (S) can use interpersonal authority as well as commu-
nication to make a worker (DM) obey. Our questions are: Can interpersonal authority substitute
for communication? How does the manager use interpersonal authority? How is the managers
14Simon (1947) and Arrow (1974) suggested that interpersonal authority is a cornerstone of organization. Van
den Steen (2010) noted that interpersonal authority is "the power of a superior to tell her subordinate what to do,
with the reasonable expectation that they will obey." Van den Steen theoretically showed that a rms centralized
asset ownership and low-powered incentives give managers interpersonal authority over workers.
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usage of interpersonal authority a¤ected by his bias?
There are several ndings. First, interpersonal authority can substitute for communication.
Second, S can use interpersonal authority as a signal instead of a punishment device. Third,
conict of interest may prevent S from relying on interpersonal authority.
We say DM "obeys" if DM selects what S recommends, i.e., P 2 fm;?g for every m. We say
DM "disobeys" if DM only selects project 1, i.e., P 2 f1;?g for every m.15
S has two ways to make DM obey. First, S can impose a penalty for disobedience, which we
call "interpersonal authority." Second, S can also communicate strategically by using cheap talk,
which we call "persuasion."
S simultaneously makes two decisions after observing his signal: S selects message m, and
decides whether to use interpersonal authority, denoted a = 1, or not, denoted a = 0. S incurs a
cost CA > 0 if he uses interpersonal authority (i.e., a = 1). Ss decisions, m and a, are observed
by DM.
DM incurs a cost of disobedience CD > 0 if S uses interpersonal authority but DM carries
out a project that is not recommended (i.e., a = 1 and P =2 fm;?g); else, DM incurs no cost of
disobedience.
We assume CD >
1 xDM
2 , which implies that S expects that DM will obey if S uses interper-
sonal authority (i.e., a = 1).
We focus on the case where xDM = xS = x.
2.6.2 Interpersonal Authority and Persuasion
We show how S uses interpersonal authority given each t and how interpersonal authority can
help information internalized in decision making.
The former is more e¢ cient than the latter in the sense that DM is indi¤erent between the
two equilibria while S is better o¤ in the former than in the latter. So, we focus on an equilibrium
that is the most informative and e¢ cient.
As Section 4 shows, S can a¤ect DMs selection of a project in an informative equilibrium
in the basic model. So, interpersonal authority does not increase Ss benet in the case (i.e.,
) where an informative equilibrium exists in the basic model (without interpersonal authority).
15As in Section 4, we decompose DMs decision into two steps, selection of a project and decision on whether to
carry out the selected project.
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On the other hand, DM ignores S in selecting a project and only selects project 1 in a babbling
equilibrium in the basic model. Hence, it su¢ ces to consider the case (i.e., ) where only babbling
equilibria exist in the basic model.
Consider t=SIM for  2  12 ; ASIM. In the basic model, only babbling equilibria exist because
both agents prefer project 1 regardless of Ss information. Thus, S may have benets if S can
reveal information without changing DMs selection of a project.
Consider t=DIF for  2

1
2 ;
1
1+x

. In in the basic model, only babbling equilibria exist because
DM disobeys and always selects project 1. S prefers a project which is more likely to succeed (i.e.,
P = ). Thus, S may have benets if S can guide DM to select project 2 given  = 2.
Therefore, S uses interpersonal authority as a signal given t=SIM but as a punishment device
given t=DIF.
Lemma 2.4 Fix x. Then:
(1) Given t=SIM, S uses interpersonal authority only if he observes  = 1; S selects m = 1 if
he uses interpersonal authority.
(2) Given t=DIF, S uses interpersonal authority only if he observes  = 2; S selects m = 2 if
he uses interpersonal authority.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, we dene sets ISIM and IDIF such that S uses interpersonal authority for  2 ISIM
given t=SIM and for  2 IDIF given t=DIF.
For  2 ISIM , S recommends project 1 (i.e., m = 1) given any , but uses interpersonal
authority (i.e., a = 1) only if  = 1. DM expects  = 1 if a = 1. Thus, DM always selects project
1, but carries out project 1 with a higher probability if a = 1. S expects the benet of increasing
the probability to exceed the cost of interpersonal authority, CA, only if  = 1.
For  2 IDIF , S induces DM to select a more successful project by using interpersonal authority
(i.e., a = 1) only if  = 2. DM is forced to select project 2 if a = 1. S expects benet of guiding
DM to select project 2 to exceed the cost of interpersonal authority, CA, given  = 2.
The comparison between t=SIM than t=DIF indicates that S uses interpersonal authority
more frequently given t=SIM than t=DIF.
Proposition 2.4 There are sets ISIM and IDIF such that S uses interpersonal authority for  2
ISIM given t=SIM and for  2 IDIF given t=DIF where ISIM 
 
1
2 ; ASIM

and IDIF 

1
2 ;
1
1+x

.
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Further, there are cuto¤s C1 and C2 such that IDIF  ISIM for CA 2 (C1; C2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2.7 depicts the result. For CA 2 (C2;1), IDIF and ISIM are both empty. For CA 2
(0; C1), IDIF \ISIM is not empty, but there is no inclusion between both sets.16
2.7 Disclosure
2.7.1 Uncertainty about Speakers Interest
Last, we show how uncertainty about the speaker (S)s interest a¤ects his pandering incentive and
hence information transmission. Suppose an investor decides whether to buy or sell stocks or not
to make a transaction. A stock analyst gives advice to the investor. The stock analyst may be
biased toward recommending "buy" to his client because he also has a position on the stock. The
stock analysts interest may not be observed by his clients unless he is forced to disclose it, which
may a¤ect the quality of his recommendation.
Many authors have argued that uncertainty about Ss interest may lead S to hide his informa-
tion. Coase (1979) wrote, "The FCC, in justifying the sponsor identication rule...has adopted a
point of view ... the public is entitled to know by whom it is persuaded."
On the other hand, Morgan and Stocken (2003), Dimitrakas and Saradis (2005) and Li and
Madarasz (2008) showed that uncertainty about Ss interest can facilitate information transmission
using the standard cheap talk model (without an outside option).17
This section shows that the result is changed if an outside option is included in the decision
maker (DM)s choice set. That is, uncertainty about Ss interest can increase Ss pandering
incentive and hence hurt information transmission.
We compare two information regimes, mandatory disclosure regime (r=Md) and non-disclosure
regime (r=Nd). We add a prior over Ss interest (t) to the basic model. The distribution is t=SIM
16The model in this section is also contrasted with Van den Steen (2009) on the relationship between interpersonal
authority and persuasion. In Van den Steen, for success, both a worker and a manager should select a correct project
and the worker should put in his best e¤orts. The manager wants the worker to select the managers ex-ante preferred
project and work hard. The manager can acquire public information at his own cost. The manager can also impose
interpersonal authority. Interpersonal authority is used as a punishment device in Van den Steen, while it may be
used as a signal in our model.
17Due to uncertainty about Ss preferences, information perceived by DM is coarser than Ss information partition.
Thus, DMs action moves away from Ss preferred action, which reduces Ss potential incentive to lie. Thus, S can
use a ner information partition without deviation.
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with probability p 2 (0; 1) and t=DIF with the remaining probability. This distribution is common
knowledge. Only S knows t.
In the mandatory disclosure regime (r=Md), there is a prior commitment that S disclose his
bias t to DM. In the non-disclosure regime (r=Nd), there is no such prior commitment and Ss
interest t is not disclosed.
The model in the mandatory disclosure regime (r=Md) is equivalent to the basic model. Thus,
we rst show the outcome in the non-disclosure regime (r=Nd). Then, we compare two regimes.
We focus on the case given xDM = xS = x. 18
2.7.2 Mandatory Disclosure versus Non-Disclosure
Consider the non-disclosure regime (r=Nd).
We will describe Ss information revelation as follows. S fully reveals information if S sends
m =  for 8 given any t. S given t=SIM partially reveals information if S sends m =  for  = 1
but randomizes between two messages given  = 2. S given t=SIM only sends m = 1 if he sends
m = 1 for 8. S reveals no information if he randomizes two messages with equal probabilities
regardless of . We also describe DMs decision as follows. DM selects what S recommends if
P 2 fm;?g for 8m. DM only selects project 1 if P 2 f1;?g for 8m.
The equilibrium outcome in the non-disclosure regime is similar to the outcome in the manda-
tory disclosure regime (i.e., in the basic model). That is, S reveals more information given t=DIF
than given t=SIM.
Lemma 2.5 In the non-disclosure regime (r=Nd):
(1) For  2

1
1+x2
; 1

, S fully reveals information given each t, and DM selects what S
recommends.
(2) For  2

ANd;
1
1+x2

, S partially reveals information given t=SIM and fully reveals in-
formation given t=DIF, and DM selects what S recommends.
(3) For  2

1
1+x ; ANd

, S only sends m = 1 given t=SIM and fully reveals information given
t=DIF, and DM selects what S recommends.
(4) For  2

1
2 ;
1
1+x

, S does not reveal any information given each t, and DM only selects
project 1.
18The result over the entire xDMxS space is available on request.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Given t=SIM, S starts to hide  = 2 for  < 1
1+x2
and never recommends project 2 for
 < ANd. Given t=DIF, S is willing to fully reveal information for any . However, for  < 11+x ,
communication collapses because DM ignores Ss recommendation in selecting a project. The
result is summarized in Figure 2.8.
The comparison between two regimes indicates that uncertainty about Ss interest can prevent
information transmission. Given t=SIM, S is more tempted to hide information in the non-
disclosure regime than in the mandatory disclosure regime because he can take advantage of
DMs trust in S with t=DIF in the non-disclosure regime.
Proposition 2.5 At least as much information is revealed under mandatory disclosure than un-
der non-disclosure. DM is weakly better-o¤ in the mandatory disclosure regime than the non-
disclosure regime for any , and strictly so for some . Further, every agent can be better-o¤ in
the mandatory disclosure regime than the non-disclosure regime for some .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Fixing t=SIM, S has a larger incentive to hide  = 2 in the non-disclosure regime than in the
mandatory disclosure regime. Consider Ss strategy where t=SIM always sends m = 1 and t=DIF
fully reveals information. Consider t=SIM and suppose S sent m = 1 on observing  = 2. In the
mandatory disclosure regime, DM knows t=SIM, expects the message to reveal no information
and carries out project 1 with probability 1/2. In the non-disclosure regime, DM expects the
message to be informative only if t=DIF and carries out project 1 with a higher probability than
1/2. So, S has a larger incentive to hide information in the non-disclosure regime than in the
mandatory disclosure regime because he can expect a higher probability that DM will carry out
project 1 in the non-disclosure regime. The result is summarized in Figure 2.9.
Uncertainty about Ss interest does not help organizations optimize information in decision
making. Instead, it increases Ss pandering incentive. The result explains why many countries
have disclosure rules. Djankov et al. (2011) study the rules and practices of nancial and conict
disclosure by members of Parliament in 175 countries and nd that the majority have disclosure
regulations. Disclosure rules in the U.S. include the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
requires investment advisors to reveal conicts of interest; the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995,
which requires lobbyists to reveal their clients; and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
which requires politicians to explicitly approve their advertisements.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper explores managerial issues using a cheap talk model with an outside option. The rst
main result is that the presence of an outside option can incentivize a speaker to pander to a
decision makers interest, but conict of interest can reduce the speakers pandering incentive and
thus enable DM to make better informed decisions. Relatedly, conict of interest can increase a
decision makers benet from delegation. We also found that interpersonal authority can mitigate
the negative e¤ect of pandering on information transmission while uncertainty about a speakers
interest can worsen the problem.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline
Figure 2.2: Full revelation equilibrium, partial revelation equilibrium, and babbling equilibrium
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Figure 2.3: Equilibria given t=SIM
Figure 2.4: Equilibria given t=DIF
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of equilibria between t=SIM and t=DIF
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Figure 2.6: Delegation and persuasion
Figure 2.7: Interpersonal authority and persuasion given Ss cost of interpersonal authority,
CA 2 (C1; C2)
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Figure 2.8: Non-disclosure regime (r=Nd)
Figure 2.9: Comparison between two regimes, the non-disclosure regime (r=Nd) and the
mandatory disclosure regime (r=Md)
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2.9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider t=SIM. DMs decision is in response to the cost and Ss messages. Given m = 1, DM
selects project 1 because:
1   (1; t)| {z }
DMs expected benet from
project 1 given m=1
 xD  (1   (1; t))| {z } ,
DMs expected benet from
project 2 given m=1
(10)
which is simplied to  (1; t)  xDM1+xDM . (10) always holds because DM is biased toward project
1 (i.e., xDM1+xDM<
1
2), and DMs belief is bounded below (i.e., 
 (1; t)  12). Then, DM carries out
project 1 if 1   (1; t)  c.
Given m = 2, DM selects project 2 only if (6) holds (i.e.,  (2; t)  11+xDM ). If (6) holds, DM
selects project 1, and DM carries it out if xDM   (2; t)  c. If (6) does not hold, DM selects
project 1, and DM carries it out if 1  (1   (2; t))  c.
Ss strategy is as follows. Given  = 1, S sends m = 1 for two reasons. First, m = 1 makes
DM select project 1. Second, S expects project 1 to be more protable than project 2:
1  |{z}
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1   (1; SIM)| {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =1
> xS  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 2
 xDM   (2; SIM)| {z } .
Probability that
DM carries out
project 2| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =1
(11)
Given  = 2, S sends m = 2 only if (6) and (7) holds.
Thus, for  2 ( 11+xDM xS ; 1), a full revelation equilibrium exists. And, a full revelation
equilibrium is the only informative equilibrium because (7) holds with strict inequality given
 (m;SIM) =  for 8m. Suppose a partial revelation equilibrium exists, i.e.,  (1; SIM) > 12
and  (2; SIM) = . (7) does not hold, meaning that m = 2 dominates m = 1 for S given  = 2.
There is a contradiction.
For  2

max
n
ASIM ;
1
1+xDM
o
; 11+xDM xS

, the only informative equilibrium is a partial reve-
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lation equilibrium such that S mixes two messages given  = 2 (i.e.,  (2; SIM) 2 (0; 1)) so that
he is indi¤erent between two messages:
xS  | {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 2
 xDM  | {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 2| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
= 1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1   (1; SIM)| {z } ,
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(12)
which is simplied to  (1; SIM) = xS xDM 
2
1  , where DMs belief is consistent:
 (1; SIM) = +(1 
(2;SIM))(1 )
2 (2;SIM) , (13)
and:
ASIM :=

 2  12 ; 1 : (12) holds given  (1; SIM) = 12	 , (14)
where  (1; SIM)=12 if 
 (2; SIM)=0.
For the remaining , there is no informative equilibrium. For the remaining , (6) does not
hold, or (12) requires  (1; sim) < 12 contradicting bounds of DMs belief.
Especially, for  2

1
2 ;
1
1+xDM

, (6) does not hold, and DM always selects project 1. Hence, if
we suppose S reveals information, i.e.,  (1; SIM) > 12 , S is always willing to send m = 1 because
m = 1 increases a probability that DM carries out project 1. Especially, given  = 2:
1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1  (1   (2; SIM))| {z }
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
< 1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1   (1; SIM)| {z } .
Probability that
DM carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(15)
There is a contradiction. Last, ADIF <
xDM
xS+xDM
if and only if xS >
1+xDM
2 .
Next, we show that more information makes both agents better o¤ xing t=SIM and any
. Consider DMs ex-ante expected payo¤, denoted by UDM (t; ). Recall that an informative
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equilibrium can exist only for a 2 ( 11+xDM ; 1). In an informative equilibrium:
UDM (t; )=
 (1; t)
2
1(1;t)Z
c=0
(1    c)  dc
| {z }
Payo¤ given =1 and m=1
+
1   (1; t)
2
xDM (2;t)Z
c=0
(xDM  (1  )  c)  dc| {z }
Payo¤ given =1 and m=2
+
 (2; t)
2
xDM (2;t)Z
c=0
(xDM    c)  dc| {z }
Payo¤ given =2 and m=2
+
1   (2; t)
2
1(1;t)Z
c=0
(1  (1  )  c)  dc
| {z }
Payo¤ given =2 and m=1
,
(16)
where  (1; t)= (2; t)=1 and  (1; t)= (2; t)= in a full revelation equilibrium,  (1; t)=1,
 (2; t) 2 (0; 1),  (1; t) 2 (1=2; ) and  (2; t)= in a partial revelation equilibrium. In a
babbling equilibrium:
UDM (t; ) =
1
2
1 1
2Z
c=0
(1    c)  dc
| {z }
Payo¤ given =1
+
1
2
1 1
2Z
c=0
(1  (1  )  c)  dc
| {z }
Payo¤ given =2
(17)
Suppose DM has full access to Ss information. For a 2 ( 11+xDM ; 1), DMs optimal decision
is P = 1 if  = 1 and c < 1  , P = 2 if  = 2 and c < xDM  , and P = ? otherwise.
For a 2

1
2 ;
1
1+xDM

where an informative equilibrium does not exist, DMs optimal decision is
P = 1 if  = 1 and c < 1   or if  = 2 and c < 1  (1  ), and P = ? otherwise. Thus,
lack of information may lead DM to select a wrong project, or carry out a correct project either
excessively or insu¢ ciently. In other words, xing , DMs ex-ante expected payo¤ is larger in a
more informative equilibrium. This observation is independent of t.
Consider Ss ex-ante expected payo¤s, denoted by US (SIM;). In a full revelation equilib-
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rium:
US (SIM;) =
1
2
1Z
c=0
(1  )  dc
| {z }
Payo¤ given =1
+
1
2
xDM Z
c=0
(xS  )  dc| {z }
Payo¤ given =2
= (1)(1)+(xS )(xDM )2
= 
2(1+xS xDM )
2 .
(18)
Similarly, in a partial revelation equilibrium:
US (SIM;) = (1)(1)+(1 )((1(1 ))(1))+((xS )(xDM ))2
= +
2xS xDM
2
= 
2xS xDM
2(1 ) ,
(19)
where := (1; SIM)=
2bB
1  and :=
 (2; SIM)= 2 1 1+ . In a babbling equilibrium:
US (SIM;) =
(1)(1 12)+(1(1 ))(1 12)
2 =
1
4 . (20)
Thus, xing  and t, an informative equilibrium makes S better o¤ compared to a babbling
equilibrium if it exists.
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider t=DIF. For  2

max
n
xDM
xS+xDM
; 11+xDM
o
; 1

, (8) holds with strict inequality given
 (m;DIF ) =  for 8m. Suppose a partial revelation equilibrium exists, i.e.,  (1; DIF ) = 
and  (2; DIF ) > 12 . (8) does not hold, meaning that m = 1 dominates m = 2 for S given  = 1.
There is a contradiction.
For  2

ADIF ;
xDM
xS+xDM

\

1
1+xDM
; 1

, the only informative equilibrium is a partial revelation
equilibrium such that S mixes two messages given  = 1 (i.e.,  (1; DIF ) 2 (0; 1)) so that he is
indi¤erent:
xS  | {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 1
 1  |{z}
Probability that
D carries out
project 1| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =1
= 1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected
benet from
project 2
 xDM   (2; DIF )| {z } ,
Probability that
D carries out
project 2| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =1
(21)
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which is simplied to  (1; SIM) = xS 
2
xDM (1 ) , where DMs belief is consistent:
 (2; DIF ) = +(1 
(2;DIF ))(1 )
2 (2;DIF ) , (22)
and:
ADIF :=
n
 2  12 ; 1 : (21) holds given  (2; DIF ) = 11+xDM o . (23)
For the remaining , there is no informative equilibrium. For the remaining , (23) requires
 (2; sim) < 11+xDM contradicting (6). Last,
xDM
xS+xDM
< 11+xDM if and only if xS > x
2
DM .
Next, we show that more information makes both agents better o¤ xing t=DIF and . From
Lemma 1, DM is better o¤ in a more informative equilibrium.
Consider Ss ex-ante expected payo¤s, denoted by US (DIF; ). In a full revelation equilib-
rium:
US (DIF; ) = (xS )(1)+(1)(xDM )2 =
2(xDM+xS)
2 . (24)
In a partial revelation equilibrium:
US (DIF; ) = (xS )(1)+(1 
0)((1(1 ))(xDM 0))+0((1)(xDM 0))
2
= (xS )(1)+(1)(xDM 
0)
2 =
2xS
2(1 ) ,
(25)
where 0:= (2; DIF )= 
2B
(1 )b and 
0:= (1; DIF )= 2
0 1
0 1+ . In a babbling equilibrium:
US (DIF; ) =
(xS )(1 12)+(xS (1 ))(1 12)
2 =
xS
4 . (26)
Thus, xing  and t, an informative equilibrium makes S better o¤ compared to a babbling
equilibrium if it exists.
Proof of Proposition 3
The result follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. Consider the last region where xS < 2x3DM   xDM .
Consider  2

ASIM ;
xD
xS+xD

. Given t=SIM, Ss strategy is  (1; SIM) = 1 and  (2; SIM) 2
(0; 1) such that (12) and (13) holds. Given t=DIF, Ss strategy is  (1; DIF ) 2 (0; 1) and
 (2; DIF ) = 1 such that (21) and (22) holds. (12) and (21) implies  (1; SIM) <  (2; DIF ),
which implies  (2; SIM) <  (1; DIF ).
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Proof of Proposition 4
As Lemma 1 showed, more information makes DM better o¤ regardless of t. Thus, xing , A1
and A2 are derived from Proposition 3.
However, the result is di¤erent for S. Fixing , S is strictly better o¤ given t=SIM than given
t=DIF when there is full information revelation (or no information revelation) in both cases. More-
over, S may be better o¤ in a less informative equilibrium given t=SIM than in a more informative
equilibrium given t=DIF. For example, for xS 2 (1+xDM2 ; 1) and  2 (xS+DM+xS xDMxS+DM ; 11+xSDM ), a
partial revelation equilibrium exists given t=SIM while a full revelation equilibrium exists given
t=DIF, but S is better o¤ given t=SIM than given t=DIF.
Proof of Lemma 5
Consider t=SIM. Because both agents are ex-ante biased toward the same project, the level of
information revelation remains unchanged with or without delegation. A full revelation equilib-
rium exists for  2

1
1+x2
; 1

, a partial revelation equilibrium exists for  2

ASIM ;
1
1+x2

, and
only babbling equilibria exist for  2  12 ; ASIM. In a babbling equilibrium, DM selects P=1 or
? with or without delegation. So, the payo¤ also remains unchanged for every agent.
Consider t=DIF. In the model with delegation, a full revelation equilibrium exists for every
. However, in the basic model (without delegation), a full revelation equilibrium exists for
 2

1
1+x ; 1

, and only babbling equilibria exist otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 6
From (16) and (17), UDM=
2(1+x2)
4 in a full revelation equilibrium and U
DM=18 in a babbling
equilibrium in both models.
Consider t=SIM. Delegation does not a¤ect DMs ex-ante expected payo¤because information
revelation remains unchanged.
Consider t=DIF. Delegation a¤ects DMs ex-ante expected payo¤ only for  2

1
2 ;
1
x+1

such
that DMs payo¤ is UDM=
2(1+x2)
4 (in a full revelation equilibrium) in the delegation model and
UDM=18 (in a babbling equilibrium) in the basic model. Thus, delegation makes DM better o¤
for  2 ( 1p
2(1+x2)
; 1x+1) and worse o¤ for  2 (12 ; 1p2(1+x2)).
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Proof of Lemma 7 and Proposition 8
Consider t=SIM for  2  12 ; ASIM. In the basic model (without interpersonal authority), there
is only a babbling equilibrium; DM only selects project 1. So, in the model with interpersonal
authority, S has benet from selecting a = 1 given  = 1 if:
1    1    CA| {z }
Ss expected benet if m=1 and a=1given =1
 1    1  (1  ) ;| {z }
Ss expected benet if m=2 and a=0given =1
(27)
which is simplied to   (2  1)  CA. In this case, a = 1 may a¤ect DMs belief not DMs
project selection. S should prefer m = 2 and a = 0 given  = 2:
1  (1  )  1  (1  )| {z }
Ss expected benet if m=2 and a=0given =2
 1  (1  )  1    CA| {z };
Ss expected benet if m=1 and a=1given =2
(28)
which is simplied to CA  (1  )  (2  1).
Consider t=DIF for  2

1
2 ;
1
1+x

. In the basic model (without interpersonal authority), DM
disobeys and always selects project 1. So, in the model with interpersonal authority, S has benet
from selecting a = 1 given  = 2 if:
1    x    CA| {z }
Ss expected benet if m=2 and a=1given =2
 x  (1  )  1  | {z };
Ss expected benet if m=2 and a=0 given =2
(29)
which is simplied to x    (2  1)  CA. In this case, DM selects project 2 given m = 2 and
a = 1. S prefers m = 1 and a = 0 given  = 1 because:
x    1  | {z }
Ss expected benet if m=1 and a=0given =1
 1  (1  )  x    CA| {z };
Ss expected benet if m=2 and a=1given =1
(30)
which is simplied to CA > 0 > (1  )  (1  2).
Thus, xing t=SIM, S uses interpersonal authority given  = 1 and fully reveals information
(a (1; SIM) = 1 and a (2; SIM) = 0.  (; SIM) = 1 for any ) for  2 ISIM :
ISIM :2

 2  12 ; ASIM :   (2  1) > CA > (1  )  (2  1)	 . (31)
Fixing t=DIF, S uses interpersonal authority given  = 2 and fully reveals information (a (1; DIF ) =
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0 and a (2; DIF ) = 1.  (;DIF ) = 1 for any ) for  2 IDIF :
ISIM :2

 2  12 ; ASIM :   (2  1) > CA > (1  )  (2  1)	 (32)
IDIF :2
n
 2

1
2 ;
1
1+x

: x    (2  1) > CA
o
: (33)
Thus, cuto¤s C1 and C2 are dened such that ISIM is not empty and IDIF  ISIM for CA 2
(C1; C2).
Proof of Lemma 9
Let Nd (; t), PNd (c;m) and Nd (m) denote Ss strategy, DMs strategy and DMs belief, re-
spectively, in the non-disclosure regime. DMs consistent belief Nd (1) is a¤ected by Ss strategies
given both of t=SIM and t=DIF.
S fully reveals information if Nd (; t) = 1 for 8 given any t. S given t=SIM partially reveals
information if Nd (1; SIM) = 1 and Nd (2; SIM) 2 (0; 1). S given t=SIM only sends m = 1 if
Nd (1; SIM) = 1 and Nd (2; SIM) = 0. S reveals no information if Nd (; t) = 12 for 8 given
any t. We also say: DM selects what S recommends if PNd (c;m) 2 fm;?g for 8m. DM only
selects project 1 if PNd (c;m) 2 f1;?g for 8m.
Suppose S fully reveals information for each t. S should a¤ect DMs selection of a project, i.e.,
(6) holds or Nd (2; t)  11+x . Given t=SIM, S should send m = 2 given  = 2:
xS    xDM  Nd (2)| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
 1  (1  )  1  Nd (1) ;| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(34)
which is equivalent to   1
1+x2
given Nd (1) = Nd (2) = . Given t=DIF, S should send m = 1
given  = 1:
xS    1  Nd (1)| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =1
 1  (1  )  xDM  Nd (2) ;| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =1
(35)
which is equivalent to   12 given Nd (1) = Nd (2) = . (34) implies (35), but the opposite
may not be true.
For  2

1
1+x2
; 1

, S fully reveals information given any t.
For  2

ANd;
1
1+x2

, S partially reveals information given t=SIM while S fully reveals
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information given t=DIF. That is, DMs belief is:
Nd (1) =
+p(1 )(1 Nd(2;SIM))
p(2 Nd(2;SIM))+1=2 , (36)
and Nd (2) = . And (34) holds with equality, i.e., Nd (1)=x
22
1  . Hence, ANd is derived as
follows:
ANd:= f 2 (12 ; 1): (34) holds with equality given
(36), Nd (2; SIM)=0 and Nd (2)=g,
(37)
where 11+x < ANd. There is no equilibrium where S partially reveals information given t=SIM as
well as given t=DIF.
For  2

1
1+x ; ANd

, (35) holds with strict inequality but (34) does not, respectively, given
(36), Nd (2; SIM) = 0 and Nd (2) = . S always sends m = 1 given t=SIM while S fully reveals
information given t=DIF.
For the remaining , (6) does not hold; S reveals no information given any t.
Proof of Proposition 10
More information makes DM better o¤ regardless of t. Thus, DM is better o¤ in r=Md than
in r=Nd for  2

1
1+x ; ANd

; and DM is indi¤erent between two regimes for  2

1
2 ;
1
1+x

[
1
1+x2
; 1

.
Consider  2

ANd;
1
1+x2

. Let Md (; t), PMd (c;m; t) and Md (m; t) denote Ss strategy,
DMs strategy and DMs posterior belief, respectively, in r=Md. In both regimes, S given t=SIM
partially reveals information (i.e., r (1; SIM) = 1 and r (2; SIM) 2 (0; 1)), and S given t=DIF
fully reveals information (i.e., r (;DIF ) = 1 for any ).
It su¢ ces to compare Ss strategy between two regimes xing t=SIM. In r=Md, S should be
indi¤erent between two messages given  = 2:
x    x  | {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
= 1  (1  )  1  Md (1; SIM) ,| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(38)
and DMs belief should be consistent:
Md (1; SIM) =
+(1 Md(2;SIM))(1 )
2 Md(2;SIM) . (39)
80
Similarly, in r=Nd, S should be indi¤erent between two messages given  = 2:
x    x  | {z }
Ss expected benet from m=2 given =2
= 1  (1  )  1  Nd (1) ;| {z }
Ss expected benet from m=1 given =2
(40)
and DMs belief should be consistent:
Nd (1) =
+p(1 )(1 Nd(2;SIM))
p(2 Nd(2;SIM))+1=2 . (41)
Thus, (38) and (40) implies Md (1; SIM) = Nd (1), which, combined with (39) and (41), implies
Md (2; SIM) > Nd (2; SIM).
Next, we show the welfare comparison between the two regimes. Let UDM;r, UDM;rt and U
S;r
t
denote the weighted average of DMs ex-ante expected payo¤s in regime r, DMs ex-ante expected
payo¤ given t and r, and Ss ex-ante expected payo¤ given t and r, respectively. Because the
weight is ex-ante distribution of each t, the formal denition is:
UDM;r = q  UDM;rSIM + (1  q)  UDM;rDIF . (42)
Consider  2

ANd;
1
1+x2

. In both regimes, S partially reveals information given t=SIM, and
S fully reveals information given t=DIF. As in the basic model, more information benets DM.
So, DM is better o¤ in r=Md than in r=Nd :
UDM; Md   UDM;Nd
_ q
2


Md (2; SIM)  Nd (2; SIM)


 
(  x  )2
2
+   (  x  1 + )
!
| {z }
Net gain from disclosure given t=SIM (>0)
+
(1  q)  (  )2
4| {z }
Net gain from disclosure given t=DIF (>0)
> 0.
(43)
Fixing t=DIF, S is also better o¤ in r=Md than r=Nd. In r=Nd, DM does not carry out a project
so frequently as DM does in r=Md because DM does not know whether t=DIF or not:
US;MdDIF   US;NdDIF _    > 0; (44)
where  = 
2x2
1  and  <  for  <
1
1+x2
. Fixing t=SIM, S is indi¤erent between both regimes
because he mixes two messages given  = 2 so that he is indi¤erent. The benet and the cost of
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hiding information are equalized.
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Chapter 3
Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and
Punishment Levels1
3.1 Introduction
If a governments objective is to minimize crime rates, two questions naturally arise: First, what
are the costs and benets an agent takes into consideration when deciding whether to commit
a crime? Second, if resources are limited, how much should the government spend in order to
minimize crime rates?
Beckers (1968) seminal paper on the theory of criminal behavior argues that if criminals are
rational, a higher probability of apprehension or higher nes as punishment will lead to a fall in
the number of crimes. Because apprehension is a costly activity to the state, and the ne is a
costless transfer from the criminal to the state, Becker recommended that the state should set the
ne at its highest value. The higher probability of apprehension, Becker asserted, complements
the higher ne in deterring individuals from committing a crime. In Beckers theory and in many
observations, criminal activity is monotonic with the probability of apprehension.
The prediction by Becker (1968) is not always consistent with the empirical literature. Myers
(1983) studied one year follow up data for o¤enders released from US prisons in 1972 and empiri-
cally showed that "increases in the certainty of punishment are positively related to participation
in crime." This paradox is also found in a number of empirical studies about the relationship be-
tween the certainty of punishment (and, therefore, apprehension) and deterrence. Tittle and Rowe
(1974) analyzed data for Florida cities in 1970 and found that certainty of arrest was positively
related to crime rates if certainty of arrest was below 30%. Fagan and Meares (2008) suggested
a paradox of punishment rates versus criminal activity, especially among minorities in the US,
where harsher punishment corresponds with counterdeterrent e¤ects on crime rates.
1This chapter is joint work with Kaiwen Leong.
83
Myers (1983), Tittle and Rowe (1974), and Fagan and Meares (2008) all found that increased
likelihood or severity of punishment is inversely correlated to the likelihood of criminal activity,
in contrast to Beckers theory. This paper proposes an alternative theory to Beckers that can be
reconciled with these counter-intuitive, empirical ndings.
To examine the monotonicity or non-monotonicity of apprehension versus criminal action, this
paper assumes that a criminal, DM, has two opportunities for criminal action in period 1 and
period 2. He is endowed with criminal productivity v which determines how much he earns by
committing a criminal act in each period. Before any decision to act or not, DM gets a noisy signal
about v. This information about his criminal productivity v remains soft at period 2 if no criminal
action was taken in period 1.2 For example, the signal could be the eeting impression about v DM
obtains from an acquaintance who is trying to recruit DM. Reder (1996), Trope (1978), Tulving
and Thomson (1973), and Tversky and Kahneman (1971) all demonstrated imperfect recall of
soft information.
The probability of a criminal action occurring in period 2 is monotonic with the probability
of apprehension if, and only if, DM chose criminal action in period 1 and has hard evidence
(incarceration or keeping the stolen property) concerning the productivity of his criminal action.
The presence of this hard evidence allows DM to make a decision concerning criminal action in
period 2 that is largely monotonic with the probability of apprehension.
If, however, DM does not commit a criminal act in period 1, DM will only be able to recall
the signal, which is soft information, imperfectly because he leads an honest life as a regular
worker, and hence does not need to access his signal. His decision at the second opportunity for
crime is based on conjecture (How successful could he have been in period 1) rather than on hard
evidence of v (how successful was he in period 1). His decision in period 2 is then based on soft
evidence, a combination of conjecture and imperfect recall of his signal in period 1, allowing for a
non-monotonic correlation between the probability of apprehension and a criminal action to take
place.
The non-monotonic correlation between the probability of apprehension and a criminal action
is not just created by this imperfect recall of soft evidence concerning criminal productivity.
2The idea of a distinction between hard information and soft information was used by Mullainathan (2002),
Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004, 2009). Soft information does not leave a material
record and is di¢ cult to verify later. We discuss these works in further detail in Section 2.
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Hyperbolic discounting of criminal payo¤s also modies the assumed linear correlation between
an action taken in period 1 and decision making in period 2.3 In the presence of temptation,
immediate benets of a criminal action are magnied by the DM, who becomes myopic and
discounts the payo¤s from a criminal action hyperbolically.
There is support for this model of non-monotonicity in the literature. Temptation is associated
with self-control. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) proposed that criminal actions are linked to
stable individual-level traits such as low self-control. Gottfredson and Hirschi asserted that "people
who lack self-control will tend to be impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk
taking, short-sighted, and nonverbal, and they will tend therefore to engage in crime and analogous
acts." This hypothesis has gained substantial empirical support, and attention has been devoted
to testing the major components of this self-control theory. A variety of studies have found
self-control to be important in predicting criminal behaviors.4
The monotonicity between the probability of apprehension and the probability of a criminal
action thus decreases in period 2 because of this hyperbolic discounting and other factors such as
poor recall of soft information, as will be discussed further in this paper.
The body of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related literature. Section 3
provides the models setup. Section 4 analyzes the model. Section 5 discusses why imperfect recall
and hyperbolic discounting are both required to obtain a non-monotonic relationship between the
probability of apprehension and the total number of criminal actions. Section 6 considers results
of the model when the assumptions made in Section 3 are relaxed. Section 7 concludes. Proofs
are gathered in the Appendix.
3The following papers suggest that non-monotonicity can also be inuenced by the DMs personality, specically,
his powers of self-control under circumstances of short-term versus long-term gain.
The "Stanford marshmallow experiment" demonstrates that children who could delay gratication for a larger
reward at ages 3-5 developed into adolescents who "were signicantly more competent" and their ability to delay
gratication at age 3-5 correlated with higher SAT scores in high schools. This experiment with young children
demonstrates the e¤ect of hyperbolic discounting on choices for future well-being and suggest this variable ability
to delay gratication can contribute to a non-monotonic relationship between criminal activity and the probability
of apprehension (Mischel et al. 1972, Shoda et al. 1990).
Lee and McCrary (2005, 2009) used a large sample on felony arrests in Florida and found that hyperbolic
discounting a¤ects o¤endersdecisions on criminal actions in predicting criminal behaviors or success in life.
4For example, low self-control is signicantly related to drunken driving (Piquero and Tibbetts, 1996), o¢ cial-
delinquency (Wood et al., 1993), and adult criminal and imprudent behaviors (Burton et al., 1994).
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3.2 Related Literature
Self-signaling. People often learn about themselves by observing their past actions. Conversely,
they often make choices to preserve favorable self-images. This is well documented in psychology.5
Bénabou and Tirole (2006b), Akerlof and Dickens (1982), and Dickens (1986) demonstrated
how self-signaling can modify the expected monotonicity between the probability of apprehension
and criminal activity.
Like our paper, Bénabou and Tirole (2006b) predicted a positive relation between the proba-
bility of apprehension and criminal actions.6 Their assumptions of factors inuencing the decision
are more complex than our assumptions. For example, Bénabou and Tiroles DM considers mon-
etary payo¤s, values of his self-image and values of social reputation about his altruism. Their
study indicates that the lower probability of apprehension may increase the value of his self-image
or social reputation as a result of avoiding a crime and, therefore, result in a smaller number
of criminal actions. On the other hand, our paper assumes that DM only considers monetary
payo¤s. We show that the lower probability of apprehension may decrease DMs condence in his
criminal productivity, which may result in a smaller number of criminal actions.
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Dickens (1986) predicted non-monotonicity between severity
of punishment and a number of criminal actions using a non-Bayesian framework that assumes
DM directly chooses his belief about the value of the crime to avoid a psychic cost of cognitive
dissonance.7 On the other hand, our study predicts non-monotonicity between the probability of
apprehension and a number of criminal actions using a Bayesian framework that assumes DM does
not directly choose his future inference. DMs prior action a¤ects his information, as discussed
earlier, which a¤ects his present inference.
Research suggests that non-monotonicity can be inuenced by self-condence and malleable
beliefs.8 In Bénabou and Tirole (2004), DM who has greater condence in his willpower will
5 In a well-known experiment, Quattrone and Tversky (1984) showed that subjects who were led to believe that
their tolerance for a certain kind of pain (keeping ones hand in very cold water) was diagnostic of either a good or a
bad heart condition reacted by extending or shortening the amount of time they withstood that pain, respectively.
6Precisely, Bénabou and Tirole showed a negative relationship between prosocial actions and the probability
that such actions are observed by others.
7 In Akerlof and Dickens (1982) and Dickens (1986), DM incurs a psychic cost when he commits a crime while
he expects huge losses from criminal actions, or when he does not commit a crime while he expects large benets
from criminal actions.
8Soman (2001) and Wertenbroch et al. (2009) provided empirical support for memory management by testing
consumersrecall of their recent expenditures.
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exercise self-control more e¤ectively and avoid future mistakes. In our paper, greater condence
in DMs criminal productivity weakens the e¤ectiveness of self-control and increase future mistakes
since it increases the temptation DM faces.
In Bénabou and Tirole (2009), malleable beliefs such as forgetting soft information may make
DM worse o¤. Because of malleable beliefs, DM may inaccurately overestimate his productivity.
As a result, DM fails to select an optimal action. In this paper, malleable beliefs may make DM
better o¤. Because DM knows that he will be tempted to commit a crime in period 2, he is willing
to not commit a crime in period 1 in order to protect himself from the temptation he will face in
period 2.
The type of information. The idea of imperfect recall is widely supported by empirical stud-
ies discussed in the introduction (Reder 1996, Trope 1978, Tulving and Thomson 1973, and
Tversky and Kahneman 1971). In addition, our model is closely related to theoretical works of
Mullainathan (2002), Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2009), all of
whom assumed that memorability of information depends on the type of information. "Hard
information," which leaves a material record, is perfectly recalled since it is veried later. "Soft
information," which does not leave veriable records, may not be recalled perfectly. Past criminal
actions and income from criminal acts constitute hard information since they are veried later.
DMs impression of how much he thinks he can earn committing a criminal act is soft information
as it does not leave a veriable record.
Mullainathan (2002) assumed that people recall soft information more perfectly if it is re-
hearsed. If a person chooses to spend an honest working life away from events that remind him
of the past, his past impression of criminal productivity, v, is not perfectly recalled. While Mul-
lainathan focused on the naive model where people do not adjust to the fallibility of memory, this
paper uses the sophisticated model.
In Bernheim and Thomadsen (2005), people know the limitations of their memory and make
direct costly investments to sustain perfect memory in the future. In this model, as in Bénabou
and Tirole (2009), people choose actions that a¤ect payo¤s today, and these actions a¤ect memory
in the future. Hence, when DM chooses a payo¤-relevant action, he needs to consider both the
marginal e¤ect on immediate payo¤s and the marginal e¤ect on future payo¤s through the e¤ect
on his future memory.
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The idea of imperfect recall is widely supported by empirical studies in biology and psychology.
Structurally, this model is closely related to Mullainathan (2002), Bernheim and Thomadsen
(2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2009), all of which assume that memorability of information
depends on the type of information. "Hard information," which leaves a material record, is
perfectly recalled since it is veried later. "Soft information," which does not leave veriable
records, may not be recalled perfectly. Past criminal actions and income from criminal acts
constitute hard information since they are veried later. A street gang members attempt to
recruit someone is soft information as it does not leave a veriable record.
Hyperbolic discounting. A branch of psychology has been devoted to understanding behav-
iors characterized by strong internal conicts and harmful impulses that cause an individual to
succumb and act against better judgment.9
Experimental psychologists have documented this robust feature of time inconsistent prefer-
ences that commonly gives rise to self-control problems, namely, peoples tendency to discount
payo¤s much more steeply at long than at short horizons.10
Criminologists suggest that criminal actions are essentially associated with impulsivity. Crim-
inal actions yield easy and immediate gains, and do not require waiting for benets from complex
tasks or tedious works (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990).11 When o¤ered easy and immediate grati-
cation from criminal actions, some people magnied the costs of honest work in decision making.
Although Beckers theoretical model draws a monotonic relationship between the probability
of apprehension and a decrease in criminal activity, the existing literature presents a number of
other factors, including self-signaling, imperfect recall, impulsivity, and hyperbolic discounting,
that can all inuence a DMs choice between criminal and legal actions and thus distort the
statistical monotonicity expected between the probability of apprehension and the probability of
criminal activity.
9 In Bénabou and Tirole (2004, 2006a), the individual is faced with a choice between a course of action that
requires no self-restraint and another that challenges his capacity to resist temptation and hold out for larger and
long-run payo¤s. See also footnotes 2 and 3.
10Ainsley and Haslam (1992) argued that humans share a general preference for immediate gains over future
gains, which may cause hyperbolic discounting. Pratt and Cullen (2000) conducted a meta-analysis on existing
empirical studies and suggest impulsive behaviors are associated with criminal acts. See also footnote 2.
11Frank (2005) and Utset (2007) argued that impulsivity is essentially connected with criminality, and crime
deterrence can be improved by accounting for the e¤ects of hyperbolic discounting. Kahneman et al. (1997) argued
that hyperbolic discounting is likely accountable for drug use.
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3.3 Model
This game considers a decision maker (DM) with a horizon of two periods, t=1, 2. At each period
t, DM can either commit a crime (at=1) or not (at=0).
Before the start of the game, DM is endowed with criminal productivity v, which represents
how much he earns by committing a crime. The parameter v is drawn from an exponential
distribution with parameter =1.
At t=1, DM receives an informative but noisy signal, ,12:
 = v + " (1)
about his criminal productivity v, where " is drawn from an exponential distribution with para-
meter =1, and " and v are independently and identically distributed.
Let fv; (; ) denote the probability distribution function (p.d.f.) of DMs criminal productivity
v and the signal  that he receives. We will denote DMs information at the beginning of each
period t by 
t. DMs information at t=1 is expressed by 
1= 2 [0; 1].
After observing a signal, DM chooses the probability of committing a crime (a1=1), which is
given by 1 2 [0; 1].13 In other words, 1 represents DMs action rule at t=1.14
If DM commits a crime (a1=1), DM will be apprehended with probability p 2 (0; 1). DM
knows the probability of apprehension p. If he is not apprehended, DM will have the payo¤ v>0,
where the payo¤ depends on his criminal productivity v. If he is apprehended, he will be ned
F>0.
If DM does not commit a crime (a1=0) but chooses to work, he will receive wage incomeW>0
in the end the period.
This paper makes a distinction between "hard information," which leaves a trace of hard evi-
dence, and "soft information," which does not leave such evidence. In this model, hard information
12For example, DM was in a bar, and was recruited to commit a street crime by a street gang member. The
50-year-old mother, who has lived in Englewood, talked about how gangs in the area had recruited her son: "Every
time they see him, they ask him if he wants some money. ... It starts with little things like that, and before you
know it, it will escalate to bigger things." [Chicagodefender.com, July 9, 2008].
13t=1 (t=0) means that DM uses the pure strategy in period t. t 2 (0; 1) means that DM uses a mixed
strategy in period t. This model needs to consider mixed strategies because there is a unique PBE where DM uses
a mixed strategy at t=2, as shown in Section 4.
14For example, DM is in a bar, and is recruited to commit a street crime by a street gang member. Then, a1=1
means that DM takes the o¤er, and a1=0 means that DM turns down the o¤er.
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includes his action at, and the payo¤ v he earns when he commits a crime.15 Soft information
includes his signal  at t=1.16
We assume that DM perfectly recalls hard information, and imperfectly recalls soft information
under some conditions. If DM commits a crime at t=1 (a1=1), he discovers v and perfectly recalls
it. For simplicity, apprehension does not a¤ect his memory of v. On the other hand, if DM does
not commit a crime at t=1 (a1=0), he will not discover v and completely forget .17
Let b denote DMs memory related to his criminal productivity at t=2, where b=v if a1=1
and b= ? otherwise. Thus, DMs information at t=2 is 
2=(b; a1) 2 [0; 1][f?gf1; 0g. Figure
3.1 illustrates this path-dependent information.
At t=2, DM chooses the probability of committing a crime again.18 The probability is denoted
by 2 2 [0; 1]. The costs and benets associated with his action are the same as at t=1. The
di¤erence from t=1 is his information, which is 
2=(b; a1).19
This paper assumes that DMs preference exhibits time inconsistency. At each of t=1,2, when
DM makes a decision, he is tempted or experiences "salience of the present" at the thought
obtaining "easy" money instantly through criminal activities instead of working hard.20
Criminal action yields immediate gain, v, to DM, while the other benets and costs such as the
wage income, W , and the ne, F , are realized in the end of the period. Hence, when DM makes
a decision, he discounts the delayed benets and costs; equivalently, he values the immediate
gratication from a criminal action at v=t instead of v but values W and F as they are in each
15The knowledge of his criminal productivity v that he obtains by committing a crime is hard information
discovered through monetary gain, which is veriable evidence. In addition, his past action a1 is also hard evidence.
If he commits a crime, he goes to the street and earns from stealing an unlocked car. If he works honestly, he goes
to his workplace every day and receives a salary. Either action leaves hard evidence.
16The signal, , is his impression about his criminal productivity, v, which he obtains through transient interac-
tions with other people. Hence, this is soft information, which is not veried later.
As a real life example, there are di¤erent perceptions of how protable auto theft is. In Washington, D.C., a
witness told a Senate committee that he became a car thief because it was very easy and there was big money in
it. [Milwaukee Journal, Nov.28, 1979] On the other hand, an anonymous reader left comments on car theft that 
a pretty dumb idea. . .  [Associated Press, Jan. 25, 2012]
17Realistically, if DM does not commit a crime, he should recall his signal with some positive probability. Since
adding this complication does not lead to qualitative di¤erences in the results, this paper studies the simplest case.
18 In this case, one week later DM thinks whether to take the past o¤er to commit a crime. For example, a2=1
means that DM goes back to the bar and takes the o¤er. a2=0 means that DM does not go to the bar, and hence
does not take the o¤er.
19This means that DM does not collect additional information in period 2. Realistically DM can go back to the
bar and collect an additional signal. Since adding this complication does not lead to qualitative di¤erences in the
results, this paper considers the simplest case.
20See Ainslie (1992, 2001) for the evidence, and Strotz (1956), Phelps and Pollack (1968), Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992), Laibson (1997, 2001), and ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) for formal models and economic implications.
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period, where t 2 (0; 1] denotes a rate of hyperbolic discounting.21
This paper considers interesting cases where DM faces increasing amounts of temptation to
commit a crime, that is, 1>2,
22 where smaller t means stronger temptation.
23 DM knows the
level of his temptation in every period. Since DM in this case has no way to resist his temptation
at t=1, we assume 1 =1.
24
DMs utility perceived by DM at t=1, denoted by U1, is given by:
U1 = E

1 

(1  p)  v
1
  p  F  W

+W j

| {z }
Perception of payo¤s which will be realized at t=1
(2)
+E [2  ((1  p)  v   p  F  W ) +W j]| {z }
Perception of payo¤s which will be realized at t=2
.
Likewise, DMs utility perceived by DM at t=2, denoted by U2, is given by:
U2 = E

2 

(1  p)  v
2
  p  F  W

+W j
2; 1

| {z }
Perception of payo¤s which will be realized at t=2
. (3)
The sequence of events is shown on the time line in Figure 3.2.
3.4 Analysis
We adopt a mixed strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept of our
problem. A PBE of this game is a pair (1; 2) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] of arguments that maximize
equations (2) and (3), meaning that:
1. DMs decision at t=1 is optimal, given his inference of his criminal productivity at t=2.
21This form of hyperbolic discounting is closely related to that of Bénabou and Tirole (2004, 2006a). Due to
this form of imperfect willpower, DM will commit a criminal act even though it is unprotable from an ex-ante
standpoint. For example, if DM commits a crime, he can earn a lot of money by stealing an unlocked car for a few
hours. However, if DM works honestly, he needs to complete a weeks worth of hard work like mopping the oor
and throwing out the trash before getting paid.
22Given 1  2, the result is qualitatively equivalent to prediction by Becker (1968); the total number of criminal
actions is monotonically decreasing in the probability of apprehension.
23Hoch and Loewenstein (1991), Shiv and Fedorikin (1999), Hinson, et al. (2003) and Vohs and Faber (2007)
studied consumer behavior and empirically show that temptation can be increasing over time.
For example, in our model, DM is new to the workforce at t=1. After working for some time, DM has realized
how di¢ cult it is to make an honest living. For this reason, the temptation he faces tomorrow is stronger than it is
today. One day in the past DM was recruited to commit a street crime. DM was tempted to earn a lot of money
by stealing an unlocked car for a few hours. One week later he remembers the past o¤er, and is more tempted to
take the o¤er.
24All the results remains unchanged given 1 < 1.
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2. At t=2, DM infers his criminal productivity using Bayesrule that takes into account his
action and his action rule at t=1.
In equilibrium, DM decides his strategy (1; 2) at the beginning of the game. This paper
assumes DMs inference at t=2 o¤ the equilibrium path as follows. If DM deviates from his
equilibrium strategy and does not commit a crime at t=1 (a1=0), he will infer his criminal
productivity (v) based on his past action (a1) and action rule (1). If DM deviates from his
equilibrium strategy and commits a crime at t=1 (a1=1), he will discover v perfectly.25
This paper shows the existence of a PBE. We analyze the equilibrium using backward induc-
tion. At t=2, DM simply considers the direct costs and benets of committing a crime:
(1  p)  E [vj
2; 1; p]
2| {z }
Benets
  (p  F +W )| {z }
Costs
. (4)
To build some intuition, rst consider DMs ex-ante optimal action rule at t=2 where DM is free
from temptation. DMs ex-ante optimal action rule at t=2 is expressed by the cuto¤ value:
Y  (p) :=
p  F +W
1  p (5)
such that committing a crime with probability 1 (2=1) is ex-ante optimal if E [vj
2; 1; p]>Y  (p)
holds, and committing a crime with probability 0 (2=0) is ex-ante optimal otherwise.
Now consider DMs ex-post optimal action rule at t=2 where DM is a¤ected by his temptation,
2 2 (0; 1). DMs ex-post optimal action rule at t=2 is now given by:
Y (p) :=
p  F +W
1  p  2. (6)
such that committing a crime with probability 1 (2=1) is ex-post optimal if E [vj
2; 1; p] >Y (p)
holds and committing a crime with probability 0 (2=0) is ex-post optimal otherwise, where
Y (p)<Y  (p). Hence, DMs temptation leads him to make a wrong decisionDM will commit a
crime even though it is not protable for him to do soif his ex-post inference falls between the
25DMs inference o¤ the equilibrium path in this model is based on arguments about the absent-minded driver and
the forgetful passenger in Aumann, Hart and Perryis (1997a, 1997b), Lipman (1997) and Piccione and Rubinstein
(1997).
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ex-ante cuto¤ value (Y  (p)) and the ex-post cuto¤ value (Y (p)):
E [vj
2; 1; p] 2 (Y (p) ; Y  (p)) . (7)
There are two possible outcomes at t=2. First, suppose DM committed a crime at t=1 (i.e.,
a1=1). He discovers his criminal productivity (i.e., b=v), and hence simply compares v and Y (p)
given by (6). As a result, he commits a crime if v>Y (p) holds, and does not commit a crime
otherwise. If (7) holds, temptation leads DM to commit a crime at t=2 while it is not optimal
ex-ante.
Second, suppose DM did not commit a crime at t=1 (i.e., a1=0). He forgets his signal (b=?),
and hence infers v from his action rule at t=1 (1) and his past action (a1=0). As a result, he
commits a crime if his inference about v is large enough, that is, if E [vj
2= (?; 0) ; 1; p]>Y (p),
and does not commit a crime otherwise.
Next, consider DMs problem at t=1. Let V1 (a1; ; 2; p) denote a value function at t=1. The
marginal benet from committing a crime at t=1 is given by:
V1 (1; ; 

2; p)  V1 (0; ; 2; p) (8)
= ((1  p)  E [vj]  p  F  W )| {z }
Payo¤ at t=1 given a1=1 minus Payo¤ at t=1 given a1=0
+
1Z
v=Y (p)
f(1  p)  v   p  F  Wg  fvj (vj)  dv
| {z }
Payo¤ at t=2 given a1=1
 2 (?; 0)  ((1  p)  E [vj]  p  F  W )| {z }
Payo¤ at t=2 given a1=0
where fvj denotes the pdf of v conditional on , and 2 (?; 0) denotes DMs strategy at t=2 on
the path a1=0. The rst term represents marginal benets which is realized at t=1. This term
is monotonically increasing in the signal  and monotonically decreasing in the probability of
apprehension p. The second term and the third term represent the forgone payo¤DM would have
obtained at t=2 if he had not committed a crime at t=1 (a1=0). Whether he gains or loses by
commiting a crime at t=1 depends on how e¤ectively he is able to stop himself from committing
a crime at t=2. This forgone payo¤ is monotonically increasing in signal . Thus, the marginal
benet from committing a crime at t=1, given by(8), is monotonically increasing in , and hence
93
there is a unique cuto¤X (p) at t=1:
X (p) :2 f 2 R+ : V1 (1; ; 2; p)  V1 (0; ; 2; p) = 0g (9)
such that committing a crime t=1 (a1=1) is protable for DM at t=1 if >X(p); and it is not for
DM at t=1 otherwise.
X (p) is a solution to a xed point problem which involves DMs problems at both periods. To
understand this, consider DMs strategy at t=2 again. At t=2, DM knows he compared his signal
 with the unique cuto¤ value X (p) when he decided 1 at t=1. If DM has forgotten his signal
(b=?), he knows that it is due to a lack of criminal experience (a1=0), and hence infers that his
signal was below the cuto¤ at t=1 (<X (p)). DMs inference about his criminal productivity is
given by:
E [vj
2 = (?; 0) ; 1; p] = E [vj < X (p) ; p] = I (X (p)) , (10)
where:
I (t) := 1 

t2
2
+ t+ 1

 exp ( t) . (11)
I is strictly increasing in its element and bounded above.26
On this path (a1=0), committing a crime at t=2 (a2=1) is protable for DM at t=2 if:
I (X (p))| {z }
Inference at t=2
(Perceived benet)
> Y (p)| {z };
Cuto¤ value at t=2
(Perceived cost)
(12)
and it is not protable for DM at t=2 otherwise. DMs inference about his criminal productivity,
I (X (p)), is interpreted as his the benets of a criminal action perceived by DM at t=2 given he
did not commit a crime at t=1 (a1=0). The cuto¤ values at t=2, Y (p), is interpreted as the costs
of a criminal action perceived by DM at t=2.
At t=1, DM uses a pure strategy almost everywhere. He commits a crime (1 ()=1) if
his signal is above the unique cuto¤ at t=1 (>X(p)). Otherwise he does not commit a crime
(1 ()=0).
26See Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix for a mathematical derivation of I.
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At t=2, DM may use a mixed strategy if he did not commit a crime at t=1. First, suppose he
commited a crime at t=1 (a1=1). He discovered his true criminal productivity v. As a result, he
uses a pure strategy such that he commits a crime (2 (v; 1)=1) if v>Y (p); he does not commit a
crime (2 (v; 1)=0) otherwise. Next, suppose that he did not commit a crime at t=1 (a1=0). He
should infer his criminal productivity I (X (p)) based on his past rule. There are three potential
consequences: he commits a crime (a pure strategy) if I (X (p))>Y (p); he does not commit a
crime (a pure strategy) if I (X (p))<Y (p); he mixes between the two actions if I (X (p))=Y (p).
Proposition 3.1 For any level of probability of apprehension p, there exist a unique PBE.
Proof. See Appendix
The important question is how di¤erent levels of p a¤ect the total number of criminal actions
across two periods.
We have shown that DM can stop himself from committing a crime at t=2 without committing
a crime (a1=0) only if I (X (p))<Y (p). In other words, DM can fail to resist to the temptations
to commit a crime at t=2 even if he succeeded in resisting to them at t=1. As mentioned earlier,
Y (p) (the cuto¤ value at t=2) is interpreted as the marginal cost of a criminal action at t=2, and
I(X(p)) (DMs inference about his criminal productivity on the path a1=0) is interpreted as the
marginal benet of a criminal action at t=2 on this path. Y (p) is increasing and convex in p. On
the other hand, I(X(p)) is increasing in p and can be concave in p.27 Figure 3.3 o¤ers a graphical
representation.
The analysis shows that the higher probability of apprehension can sometimes result in more
criminal actions. Consider the outcome at t=2 when DM did not commit a crime at t=1 (a1=0).
There are three cases based on the probability of apprehension p; p is high, medium or low.
When p is low, he does not commit a crime at t=2 (a2=0) if he did not commit a crime at
t=1 (a1=0) because he infers that he is of very low productivity. In other words, when p is low,
DM sets the cuto¤ value X (p) at a very low level; DM does not commit a crime at t=1 when
he receives a low signal <X (p). At t=2, he infers that he did not commit a crime because he
has very low criminal productivity, which prevents him from committing a crime at t=2. That is,
I(X(p))<Y (p) holds.
27Precisely I (X (p)) is convex in p for small p and concave in p for large p.
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When p is high, he does not commit a crime at t=2 (a2=0) if he did not commit a crime at t=1
(a1=0) because the probability of apprehension is very high. He sets X(p) at a high value, causing
him to infer that he is of high criminal productivity at t=2. However, the cost of committing a
crime dominates the benet at t=2 because p is very high. Thus, DM does not commit a crime
at t=2. That is, I(X(p))<Y (p) holds.
On the other hand, when p is medium, DM commits a crime at t=2 (a2=1) even if he did
not at t=1 (a1=0). DM thinks that the fact that he did not commit a crime does not necessarily
mean he has low criminal productivity. And, p is only medium. Besides, DM is more tempted
to commit a crime at t=2 than at t=1. Thus DM fails to resist to temptations at t=2 even if he
succeeded to resist to them at t=1. That is, I(X(p))>Y (p) holds.
In summary, given that DM did not commit a crime (a1=0), the number of criminal actions
at t=2 is not monotonically decreasing in the probability of apprehension p. See Figures 3.4 and
3.5 for an illustration.
This non-monotonicity is observed when DMs temptation 2 is medium. In other words,
there exist cuto¤ values B1 and B2, where 0<B1<B2<1, such that for 2 2 (B1; B2), there is non-
monotonicity between the number of criminal action at t=2 and the probability of apprehension
p conditional on the path a1=0.
On the other hand, if his temptation is strong (2<B1), he will succeed in resisting to tempta-
tions at t=2 on the path a1=0 (I(X(p))<Y (p)) only when p is high; he will fail to resist to them
(I(X(p))>Y (p)) otherwise. This result is monotonic. If his temptation is weak (2>B2), he will
succeed in resisting to temptations at t=2 on the path a1=0 (I(X(p))<Y (p)) for any level of p.28
The result is again monotonic.
For example, consider 2=0:3, F=1:5 and W=0:4, where 2 2 (B1; B2). The cuto¤ value
at t=1, X (p), and the cuto¤ value at t=2, Y (p), are both monotonically increasing in p. But,
conditional on the path a1=0, his criminal action at t=2 is not monotonically decreasing in p.
Proposition 3.2 Consider 2 2 (B1; B2). There exist P1 and P2, where 0<P1<P2<1, such that
in equilibrium:
(1) DM will commit a crime at t=2 with a positive probability if he did not commit a crime
at t=1 for p 2 (P1; P2).
28See Proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix for mathematical denitions of B1 and B2.
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(2) DM will not commit a crime at t = 2 if he did not commit a crime at t=1 for the remaining
p.29
Proof. See Appendix
Lastly, consider the total number of criminal actions for two periods, which is given by:
E [a1 + a2] :=
Z
v
Z

E [1 () + 

2 (
2) j; v]  f;v (; v) : (13)
Precisely, expression (13) denotes the ex-ante expected total number of criminal actions for two
periods. As explained earlier, an increase in the probability of apprehension p can increase the
number of criminal actions at t=2 for 2 2 (B1; B2) while an increase in p decreases the number
of criminal actions at t=1 for any 2. For 2 2 (B1; B2), the rst e¤ect dominates the second
e¤ect. In other words, E [a1 + a2] is also non-monotonic in p, as shown in Figure 3.6.
Proposition 3.3 Consider 2 2 (B1; B2). The total number of criminal actions for two periods
is not monotonically decreasing in the probability of apprehension p.
Proof. See Appendix
There is an interesting observation that the cuto¤ value at t=1, X(p), is sometimes decreasing
in his level of temptation, 2, while his cuto¤ value at t=2, Y (p), is monotonically increasing in
2, as shown in Figure 3.7. (Smaller 2 means stronger temptation.) The result implies that the
stronger temptation at t=2 can result in a reduction of criminal actions at t=1. As his temptation
is stronger (2 is smaller), he uses a stricter action rule at t=1 (X(p) is higher). In other words,
DM exercises self-control at t=1 because he knows he will be a¤ected by temptation at t=2.
3.5 Discussion
There are the two key ingredients in the model: temptation and imperfect recall. This section
discusses what happens if both or either component is removed. Will the result that the total
number of criminal actions is not monotonic in the probability of apprehension still hold?
Consider a model in which there is neither temptation nor imperfect recall. DM is not a¤ected
by temptation and perfectly remembers what he observed in the past. If DM nds it protable
to commit a crime today, he will also nd it protable to commit a crime tomorrow. As the
29See Proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix for mathematical denitions of P1 and P2.
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probability of apprehension increases, DM is less likely to commit a crime in every period, yielding
a monotonic relationship between the probability of apprehension and the total number of criminal
actions.
Suppose that DM is a¤ected by temptation, but has perfect recall. He will be tempted to
commit a crime tomorrow even if it is not a protable decision from the ex-ante standpoint.
Hence, even if he does not commit a crime today, he cannot stop himself from committing a crime
tomorrow. As the probability of apprehension increases, the benet from committing a crime is
dominated by the cost of committing a crime in every period. Thus, the total number of criminal
actions is monotonically decreasing in the probability of apprehension.
Suppose that DM has imperfect recall, but is not a¤ected by temptation; that is, he forgets
the signal about his own criminal productivity if he does not commit a crime, but discovers his
criminal productivity if he commits a crime. If DM did not commit a crime at t=1, he will infer
his criminal productivity from his past action and his action rule at t=1. Without temptation,
DM knows that if he did not commit a crime at t=1, it was not because he was trying to exercise
self-control, but because it was unprotable. If criminal activity is not protable today, it will not
be protable tomorrow. As the probability of apprehension increases, DM is less likely to commit
a crime in every period.
Thus, in order to understand the observed non-monotonic relationship between the total num-
ber of criminal actions and the probability of apprehension in this paper, both imperfect recall
and temptation are indispensable.
3.6 Robustness
This section explains what would happen if some of the assumptions in the model are relaxed.
The rst assumption is that the probability of apprehension is constant across both periods. What
happens if the probability of apprehension changes across periods? For example, let the probability
of apprehension at t=1 be twice that at t=2. Crime would then be more protable at t=2 than
at t=1, and DM would be more likely to commit a crime at t=2 than in this model. Thus, non-
monotonicity between the total number of criminal actions and the probability of apprehension
remains unchanged.
The second assumption is that criminal productivity v is drawn from an exponential distri-
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bution. Then, the paper has shown that DMs inference on the path a1=0 is increasing and
sometimes concave in p. The concavity is one of key features which lead to non-monotonicity
between the total number of criminal actions and the probability of apprehension. The result
remains unchanged using any thin tail distribution. For example, let v be drawn from a truncated
normal distribution whose support is (0;1). The inference is a¤ected by the cuto¤ value at t=1,
X (p), and how densely criminal productivity v is distributed below X (p). As p increases, X (p)
increases, and the marginal increase in density of v below X(p) diminishes eventually due to thin
tails of the distribution. Hence, the inference exhibits concavity with respect to p.
3.7 Conclusion
It is important to understand the relationship between the total number of criminal actions and
the probability of apprehension. Suppose a governments objective is to attain the smallest number
of criminal actions. At the same time, it cannot increase the probability of apprehension substan-
tially due to resource constraints. This model suggests that a zero increase in the probability of
apprehension can be better than a small increase.
This study will single out an interesting avenue for further research. The main idea presented
here is that people have imperfect access to their own abilities and motives, and must therefore
infer them from their past actions. This framework can provide the foundation for a theory of
personal, professional, or socio-cultural identity as a cognitive investment.30
Many interesting questions remain, such as the optimal design of contracts or the political
economy of reforms when agents have motivated beliefs.
30Bénabou and Tirole (2011) develops a theory of individual and collective moral behavior based on a general
model of identity in which people care about "who they are" and infer their own values from past choices.
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Figure 3.1: Information structure as a result of action taken
Figure 3.2: Timeline
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Figure 3.3: DMs inference in period 2, I (p), and the cuto¤ value in period 2, Y (p)
Figure3.4: Probability of apprehension, p, and the cuto¤ value in each period, X (p) or Y (p)
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Figure3.5: Non-monotonicity between the probability of apprehension, p, and the number of
criminal actions in period 2 given that DM does not commit a crime in period 1, E [a2ja1 = 0]
Figure 3.6: Non-monotonicity between the probability of apprehension, p, and the ex-ante
expected total number of criminal actions in two periods, E [a1 + a2]
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Figure3.7: Relationship between temptation in period 2, 2, and the cuto¤ value in each period,
X (p) or Y (p)
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3.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In the proof, let =2. Let 

t (
t; p) denote the equilibrium strategy at period t=1; 2 conditional
on DMs information 
t and the probability of apprehension p.
Let f () denote the unconditional pdf of signal , and fvj (vj) the pdf of criminal produc-
tivity v conditional on signal . From the denition of the joint distribution fv; (v; ), each pdf
is given by:
f ()=
8<:   exp ( ) for 8>00 otherwise, (14)
and:
fvj (vj)=
8<:
1
 for v>0 and >v
0 otherwise.
(15)
DMs inference at t=1 is:
E

fv
 
v0
 j = fv; (v0; )R
v"
fv; (v"; )
. (16)
DMs inference at t=2 is:
E

fv
 
v0
 j
2 =
8<: 1 if v
0
= v
0 otherwise
if 
2= (v; 1) (17)
and:
E

fv
 
v0
 j
2 =
R
0:1(0;)=0
fv; (v
0; 0)R
v"
R
0:1(0;p)=0
fv; (v"; 0)
if 
2= (?; 0) . (18)
We show that there exist functions X (), Y () and I (), which characterize a unique PBE.
Fix any p. DMs optimization at t=1 given 
1= is:
1 (; p) =
8<: 1 for  > X (p)0 otherwise. (19)
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DMs optimization at t=2 given 
2=(a2; b) is:
2 (1; v; p) =
8<: 1 if v > Y (p)0 otherwise, (20)
and
2 (0;?; p) 2
8>>>><>>>>:
f1g if I (X (p)) > Y (p)
(0; 1) if I (X (p)) = Y (p)
f0g if I (X (p)) < Y (p) .
(21)
Y () and I () is given by (6) and (11) respectively. Hence, it su¢ ces to show the existence
of a unique xed point X and 2 (0;?; p), which is a solution to DMs problem at t=1 and his
problem at t=2 on the path a1=0:
(X (p) ; 2 (0;?; p)) (22)
: 2
n
(x; ) 2 [0; 1]2 : (23), (24) and (25) hold.
o
,
where:
H (p; x) := I (x)  Y (p) ; (23)
x = x (p; ) :=

W + F  p
1  p


 
1 +
s
1  (2  )  
2  
!
, (24)
 2
8>>>><>>>>:
f1g if H (p; x (p; 1)) > 0
f0g if H (p; x (p; 0)) < 0
f0 2 (0; 1) : H (p; x (p; 0)) = 0g otherwise.
(25)
First, x X (p)>0. Consider DMs problem at t=2 on the path a1=0:
2 (
2; p) 2 max  

(1  p)  E [vj
2; 

1]

  p  F  W

+W , (26)
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where 
2=(?; 0). DMs inference is derived as follows:
E [vj
2 = (?; 0) ; 1] (27)
=
X(p)Z
=0
E [vj]  f ()  d
=
X(p)Z
=0
2
2
 exp ( )  d
= 1 
 
X (p)2
2
+X (p) + 1
!
 exp ( X (p))
 I (X (p)) ,
where I() is monotonic in its element and has a nite codomain (0; 1) over its domain (0;1).
There may exist a mixed strategy because this is a xed point; DM uses a pure strategy if
I (X (p)) 6= Y (p), and a mixed strategy otherwise, as given in (21).
Next, x 2 (0;?; p)= 2 [0; 1]. Consider DMs problem at t=1. There exist a unique pure
strategy almost everywhere because the value function V1 is continuous in , and  is continuum.
It su¢ ces to compare two value functions as follows:
V1 (1; ; 

2; p)  V1 (0; ; 2; p) (28)
= (1  p)  E [vj]  p  F  W
+
1Z
v=Y (p)
f(1  p)  v   p  F  Wg  fvj (vj)  dv
   ((1  p)  E [vj]  p  F  W )
=
8><>: (2  ) 

(1 p)
2   p  F  W



(1 p)Y (p)
2
 pF W

Y (p)
 if  > Y (p)
(1  ) 

(1 p)
2   p  F  W

otherwise:
Equation (28) implies:
V1 (1; ; 

2; p)  V1 (0; ; 2; p)
8<: > 0 for  !1< 0 if  < Y (p) , (29)
and
@V1 (1; ; 

2; p)  V1 (0; ; 2; p)
@
8<: > 0 for  2 (k (p; ) ;1)< 0 for  2 (Y (p) ; k (p; )) , (30)
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where k (p; ) > Y (p) and:
k (p; ) :=
s
 (1  p)  Y (p)
2
+ p  F +W

 2Y (p)
(2  )  (1  p) . (31)
Hence, by Intermediate Value Theorem, for any  2 [0; 1], a unique cuto¤ value at t=1, denoted
by x(p; ), is dened as follows:
x (p; ) :2
8<:  2 (Y (p) ;1) : V1 (1; ; 2; p)  V1 (0; ; 2; p) = 0;2 (1; v; p) satises (20), and 2 (0;?; p) = 
9=; . (32)
Equation (32) is simplied to (24). Finally, dene a hyperplane h such that:
h (p; ) := H (p; x (p; )) = I (x (p; ))  Y (p) : (33)
Then, for any p, a xed point, X (p) and 2 (0;?; p), is well dened as shown in (22) because
h (p; ) and x (p; ) are di¤erentiable and strictly monotone with respect to  such that:
@x (p; )
@
< 0 and
@h (p; )
@
< 0 for 8 2 [0; 1] . (34)
Proof of Proposition 2
Fix any p. Let 2 (0;?; p)= and x=x (p; ). The hyperplane h is expressed as follows:
h (p; ) = I (x (p; ))  Y (p)  I (x)  x  
1 +
q
1  (2 )2 
. (35)
We want to show a non-monotonic relationship between the probability of apprehension p and
DMs criminal action at t=2 on the path a1=0. It su¢ ces to show the following results:
1. For any , DM does not commit a crime at t=2 on the path a1=0 at the limit p% 1:
lim
p%1
2 (0;?; p) = 0 , lim
p%1
h (p; 0) < 0. (36)
2. There exist  2 (B1; B2) such that DM does not commit a crime at t=2 on the path a1=0
at the limit p& 0:
lim
p&0
2 (0;?; p) = 0, lim
p&0
h (p; 0) < 0, (37)
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and DM does not commit a crime at t=2 on the path a1=0 at some p:
max
p2(0;1)
2 (0;?; p) = 1, max
p2(0;1)
h (p; 1) > 0. (38)
(36) holds because DMs inference is bounded I(x) < 1, but lim
p%1
Y (p) =1. There is a lower
bound B1 so that (37) holds if and only if  > B1 holds where:
B1 :2
8>><>>:
 2 (0; 1) : lim
p&0
h (p; 0) = I (x)   W = 0
and x = lim
p&0
x (p; 0) =W 

1 +
q
1+(1 )2
2

9>>=>>; . (39)
This is true because @h(p;)@ < 0 over  2 (0; 1), lim&0limp&0h (p; 0) > 0 and lim%1limp&0h (p; 0) < 0.
There is an upper bound B2 such that (38) holds for  < B2, where:
B2 :2
8><>:  2 (0; 1) : 1 

T 2
2 + T + 1

 exp ( T )  T 2  = 0 and
T :2
n
x > 2 : x
2
2  exp ( x) = 2 
o
9>=>; . (40)
This upper bound is derived as follows. Let x=x (p; 1). Then, dene l (x;) such that:
l (x;) := 1 

x2
2
+ x+ 1

 exp ( x)  x  
2   . (41)
l (x; ) is convex for x < 2 and concave for x > 2; @l(x;)@x is maximized at x = 2. Recall
h (p; 1) = I (x)  Y (p)  l (x;).
It su¢ ces to nd a range of  given which there exists x > 2 satisfying:
l (x; ) = 1 

x2
2
+ x+ 1

 exp ( x)  x  
2   > 0, (42)
@l (x; )
@x
=
x2
2
 exp ( x)  
2   = 0. (43)
(42) and (43) are equivalent to  < B2, where B2 is given by (40). Consequently, if  2 (B1; B2),
there exist cuto¤s 0 < P1 < P3 < P4 < P2 < 1, where:
h (P1; 0) = h (P2; 0) = 0 and h (P3; 1) = h (P4; 1) = 0. (44)
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Hence, a non-monotonic relation between p and 2 (0;?; p) is observed as follows:
2 (0;?; p) 2
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
f0g if p 2 (0; P1)
(0; 1) if p 2 (P1; P3)
f1g if p 2 (P3; P4)
(0; 1) if p 2 (P4; P2)
f0g if p 2 (P2; 1) .
(45)
2 (0;?; p) is increasing in p for p 2 (P1; P3) while it is decreasing in p otherwise.
For example, given =0:3, F=0:5 andW=0:4, the cuto¤s are B1  0:11, B2  0:32, P1  0:25,
P2  0:55, P3  0:33 and P4  0:52. As a result, non-monotonic relationship is observed as shown
in Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
Proof of Proposition 3
Fix any p. Let 2 (0;?; p)= and x=x (p; ). The total number of criminal actions are derived as
follows:
E [a1 + a2] =
1Z
0
E [1 () + 

2 (
2) j]  f ()  d (46)
=
1Z
=x
2  f () d + x 
xZ
=0
f () d
= + (2  )  (x+ 1)  exp ( x) :
Given =1:
E [a1 + a2] = 1 + (x+ 1)  exp ( x) , (47)
where x = x (p; 1) =

p  F +W
1  p

 (2  ) .
Given =0:
E [a1 + a2] = 2  (x+ 1)  exp ( x) , (48)
where x = x (p; 1) =

p  F +W
1  p


0@1 +
s
1 + (1  )2
2
1A .
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In either case, E [a1 + a2] is decreasing in p. Hence, it su¢ ces to show the following inequality:
2 (x+ 1)  exp ( x) < 1 +  x0 + 1  exp   x0 , (49)
where:
x : = x (P1; 0) =

P1  F +W
1  P1


0@1 +
s
1 + (1  )2
2
1A ,
x0 : = x (P3; 1) =

P3  F +W
1  P3

 (2  ) ,
P1 : 2 min fp 2 (0; 1) : h (p; 0) = 0g ,
P3 : 2 min fp 2 (0; 1) : h (p; 1) = 0g .
(49) holds if x0=x = 1. It may not hold for very large for very large x0=x. And x0=x increases as
h(p;0)
h(p;1) increases;
h(p;0)
h(p;1) is increasing in .
Hence, it su¢ ces to nd the upper bound for  such that (49) holds. First suppose =B2, the
upper bound for Proposition 2, which implies x
2
2  exp ( x) = 2  .
Hence, for =B2, x=x (P1; 0) and x0=x (P2; 1) satisfy:
x 2

t : h (P1; 0) = 0 and
t2
2
 exp ( t) = 
2  

(50)
) 2 (x+ 1)  exp ( x) = 2  2
2    
2x  
1 +
q
1+(1 )2
2
,
and
x0 2

t : h (P3; 1) = 0 and
x02
2
 exp   x0 = 
2  

(51)
) 1 +  x0 + 1  exp   x0 = 2  
2    
x0  
2   .
(50) and (51) imply (49) because:
2 (x+ 1)  exp ( x) < 1 +  x0 + 1  exp   x0 (52)
, x
0   1
x
<
2 (2  )
1 +
q
1+(1 )2
2
.
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The last inequality holds because:
x0   1
x

2     1 ppF+W
1 +
q
1+(1 )2
2
<
2     1W
1 +
q
1+(1 )2
2
<
2 (2  )
1 +
q
1+(1 )2
2
. (53)
Hence, =B2 is the upper bound such that (49) holds. Hence, (49) holds for  2 (B1; B2).
For example, given =0:3, F=0:5 and W=0:4, non-monotonic relationship is observed as
shown in Figure 3.6.
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